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Abstract 
 
As the Internet and society become ever more integrated so the number of Internet users 
continues to grow. Today there are 1.6 billion Internet users. They use its services to 
work from home, shop for gifts, socialise with friends, research the family holiday and 
manage their finances. Through generating both wealth and employment the Internet 
and our economies have also become interwoven. The growth of the Internet has 
attracted hackers and organised criminals. Users are targeted for financial gain through 
malware and social engineering attacks. Industry has responded to the growing threat by 
developing a range defences: antivirus software, firewalls and intrusion detection 
systems are all readily available. Yet the Internet security problem continues to grow 
and Internet crime continues to thrive. Warnings on the latest application vulnerabilities, 
phishing scams and malware epidemics are announced regularly and serve to heighten 
user anxiety. Not only are users targeted for attack but so too are businesses, 
corporations, public utilities and even states. Implementing network security remains an 
error prone task for the modern Internet user. In response this thesis explores whether 
intrusion detection and management can be effectively offered as a web service to users 
in order to better protect them and heighten their awareness of the Internet security 
threat.  
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1 Introduction 
As the Internet and society become ever more integrated so the number of Internet users 
continues to grow. Today there are 1.6 billion Internet users [1]. They use its services to 
work from home, shop for gifts, socialise with friends, research the family holiday and 
manage their finances. No longer a medium for the passive delivery of information the 
Internet and the World Wide Web (WWW) it supports have evolved into full 
application development frameworks and thanks to Web 2.0 technologies the distinction 
between traditional desktop PC applications and the latest Internet applications is 
blurred. Such applications along with an ever-expanding list of web browser plug-ins 
continue to enrich the WWW experience, bringing it to life and attracting new interest. 
Already embedded in our culture, the Internet and our economies have also become 
interwoven. The Internet generates both wealth and employment. In 2008 almost two 
thirds of all enterprises in the EU had a website [2]. In the same year e-commerce sales 
in the EU were worth 106 billion euros and this figure is projected to reach 323 billion 
euros by 2011 [3]. Given its growing cultural and economic importance there is every 
reason to believe the Internet explosion is set to continue. 
The surge in Internet use has not gone unnoticed by hackers and organised criminals. 
Internet crime has expanded in parallel with the growing number of Internet users. 
Users are at risk, targeted for financial gain through malware and social engineering 
attacks. Industry has responded to the growing threat by developing a range of products 
for the home and business user: antivirus software, firewalls and intrusion detection 
systems are all available in commercial and free, open source form. Yet despite the 
widespread availability of such countermeasures the Internet security problem continues 
to grow and Internet crime continues to thrive. Between 2001 and 2006 Kaspersky Labs 
reported an 800% increase in the number of new malicious programs [4]. Online crime 
costs an estimated one trillion USD annually according to the World Economic Forum 
[5]. Warnings on the latest application vulnerabilities, phishing scams and malware 
epidemics are announced regularly and serve to heighten user anxiety. Not only are 
users at risk but so too are businesses, corporations, public utilities and even states [6]. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1.1 we consider the 
factors that make the Internet security problem difficult to solve and we ask why 
Internet crime and hacker activity are expanding despite the widespread availability of 
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defences. In light of the evident difficulty faced by today‟s users in implementing and 
maintaining network and Internet security we present the research question this thesis 
seeks to address in Section 1.2. The structure of the remainder of the thesis is given in 
Section 1.3. 
1.1 The Internet Security Problem: Contributing Factors 
Despite the availability of security-enforcing/monitoring software and the security 
industry's understanding of the issues involved, implementing network security remains 
an error prone task for the modern Internet user. Below we consider some reasons why 
this is the case and why failing to adequately secure their machines is exposing users to 
a growing range of threats. These questions are explored further in Chapter 2 but briefly 
described here in order to set the context for our research question. 
Evolving Internet User Profiles (Who is using the Internet?) 
Internet use has exploded over the last 15 years. New media-rich Internet applications 
and technologies are attracting not only an increasing number of users but also new 
kinds of user. Social networking sites such as Bebo [7], MySpace [8] and Facebook [9] 
are marketed towards younger audiences. The average age of a Facebook user is 21 
years and most users are 18-24 years of age. According to research conducted in 2008 
by Ofcom, the UK's broadcasting and telecommunications regulator, 49% of children 
aged 8-17 years who use the Internet have a profile on a social networking site [10]. Not 
only are new younger users targeted by such websites but so too are older ones: Saga 
Zone [11] is a social network specifically aimed at the over 50s market. 
This new brand of user lacks technical expertise and/or has only a limited awareness of 
the Internet security threat. Such users may not be equipped to be solely responsible for 
the secure configuration and maintenance of an Internet-connected PC. For them, a 
minimum requirement is that defences come pre-installed and pre-configured. However, 
even pre-installed defences such as antivirus software and firewalls may present 
challenges. While antivirus software requires minimal maintenance, securely 
configuring a firewall is not so straightforward. The default firewall setting may allow 
all incoming and outgoing connections in order to avoid early troubleshooting. Ensuring 
a secure Internet connection is thus not merely a question of running a firewall but 
running a securely configured firewall. In addition, some interaction between the users 
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and firewall is often required in order to enable/disable certain services and to 
differentiate between private and public networks etc. Confused and/or busy users may 
resort to a default "Allow Full Internet Access" policy when confronted with such 
questions. Many of today‟s users thus cannot be consistently relied upon to secure such 
software and as a result many users' machines will often be vulnerable to attack due to 
improper configuration and maintenance. Worse yet, defences may not even be installed. 
In 2005 Australian researchers found that only one in seven computers in Australia used 
a firewall and only about one in three used up-to-date antivirus software [12]. More 
complex configuration, such as that required to install and run an intrusion detection 
system such as Snort [13] is beyond the scope of average users. Although potentially of 
significant benefit to users in both raising their security awareness and in determining 
whether their machine has been successfully exploited, installing such software is too 
complex a task for the average user to consider. 
There is clear evidence that in addition to failing to run defences many of today's users 
do not regularly update or apply patches to the software they use to interact with a 
hostile Internet: the browser. In 2008 there were 650 million Internet users browsing the 
web with known, exploitable vulnerabilities in their browsers [14]. Consequently, the 
browser serves as a popular attack vector. Even when the browser itself cannot be 
exploited, ill-equipped users may be incentivised into installing trojan software through 
social engineering. It is estimated that 59 million users in the US have spyware or other 
types of malware on their computers [15]. 
In summary, many of today's Internet users are unaware they are targeted and/or do not 
have the technical experience to ensure their safety in an increasingly hostile 
environment. 
Proliferation of Wireless Networks and Devices (How are users connecting?) 
Not only is it that more and more non-security-conscious users are connecting to the 
Internet but a further contributing factor to weak network security is from where these 
users are connecting: wireless devices and networks have surged in popularity over 
recent years. Wireless-network-ready devices are now the norm as users seek to surf the 
web without the hindrance of network cables. Devices such as PDAs (Portable Digital 
Assistants), smart phones, laptops and games consoles (e.g. Sony‟s Play Station 
Portable) are all wireless-network-ready. One factor driving the expansion of wireless 
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networks is convenience: because they offer a flexible and affordable approach to rapid 
network deployment, they are an attractive option for businesses such as cafés, airports, 
hotels etc. seeking to cash in on an ever growing set of Internet-hungry customers. 
However, the anonymity afforded to wireless network users compared with users of 
traditional wired networks makes the former attractive hunting grounds for 
eavesdroppers and intruders [16, 17]. Furthermore, their very convenience means such 
networks are routinely administered by non-security professionals and often run under 
insecure configurations. In effect we are witnessing the emergence of a new brand of 
Internet administrator as well as user. Users of public wireless networks may mistakenly 
assume that defences typically deployed at the network perimeter (e.g. a firewall) are in 
place when in fact they are absent, leaving client machines open to attack. Users of such 
networks are generally unaware of the implicit trust they place in its administrator and 
in their fellow users. 
WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy/Wireless Encryption Protocol) is often the default 
encryption algorithm on wireless routers. It can be broken in a matter of minutes using 
freely available utilities such as Aircrack [18][19]. Many of the new Internet 
generation's users and administrators are unaware of this fact. Once a WEP key is 
obtained sniffing network traffic including confidential personal details suitable for 
identity and financial theft is straightforward in the absence of further encryption [20]. 
Similarly straightforward is bandwidth hijacking for the download of illegal content. 
Many networks are even deployed with no encryption at all. Implementing a secure 
wireless network is more involved than simply adding a wireless router to a broadband 
connection. Securely configuring the wireless router should include hiding the network's 
SSID (Service Set Identifier), applying MAC (Media Access Control) and IP (Internet 
Protocol) address filters, creating a secure access password for the network and 
choosing an appropriate encryption standard. Many users are failing to take these steps. 
We look further at wireless security issues in Chapter 2. 
Rising Hacker and Malware Sophistication (Aren’t attacks difficult to mount?) 
Hackers and the malware they write are becoming more sophisticated. It is also 
becoming easier to create malware as more and more free tools and malware 
development kits appear online. Software originally developed to aid security specialists 
in verifying network security is used by intruders to detect and attack vulnerabilities. 
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Classic hacker behaviour follows a three step process: Network reconnaissance, 
host/service enumeration and finally exploitation. For each of these steps the hacker has 
a selection of tools to choose from. The target is selected during the network 
reconnaissance stage. Here tools such as nslookup and dig [21] help the intruder gain a 
high level overview of the target by querying publicly available information. During the 
second stage accessible hosts are detected and scanned for services using a network 
scanner. Nmap [22] allows the identification of the target operating system and the 
versions of the various network services it exports. Once a vulnerability has been 
identified the final step for the hacker is its exploitation. Here a library of exploits such 
as that provided by the Metasploit project [23] does the complicated work. The attacker 
passes to Metasploit a vulnerability descriptor and specifies the level of control she 
wishes to gain over the host (e.g. a remote root shell). Metasploit generates the payload 
and will even inject it into the target host. Once control over a host is achieved the 
attacker may install malware in order to retain complete control should the original 
vulnerability be patched. Here too the attacker has a range of freely available malware 
and rootkits to choose from across the Internet [24]. The victim may be merged into a 
botnet controlled using a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) toolkit such as Trinoo, 
TFN2K or MStream [25]. Once the intruder has control of one host and gained a 
foothold in the target network, transitive trust relations may be exploited to take over 
other hosts. 
Users and businesses are suffering as they fail to adequately defend themselves from 
malware. One survey [26] puts the annual cost of cleaning up malware in the US at 67 
billion USD. The impact on users is more difficult to estimate but US consumers spent 
an estimated 4 billion USD over a two year period repairing damage due to malware 
[15]. 
1.2 Research Question 
In summary, a growing number of users of insufficient security awareness are accessing 
an increasingly hostile Internet from an expanding number of potentially insecure 
networks [27]. Users are not taking sufficient precautions because they are not aware of 
the Internet threat and/or lack the technical ability to mitigate it. Our research question 
asks whether intrusion detection and management can be effectively offered as a web 
service to users in order to better protect them and heighten their awareness of the 
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Internet security threat (raising threat awareness has been identified by the OECD as a 
key factor in fighting malware [28]). We propose a defence-in-depth approach to 
protecting users and the addition of an extra security layer, an IDS (Intrusion Detection 
System) designed with the following goals. It should: 
 Demonstrate to users that they are targets in order to raise their security 
awareness 
 Provide feedback to users on the behaviour of their machine (as seen by others 
on the network) in order to detect possible malware infection 
 Be remotely administered and configured to relieve the user of technical 
complexity 
 Offload intrusion analysis to make it suitable for deployment on mobile devices 
of limited processing power 
 Increase vigilance only in the face of a possible attack in order to limit excess 
network traffic 
 Be web accessible so mobile users (business and recreational) are free to roam 
networks and the Internet and receive constant feedback 
 Export a web interface to ensure users receive feedback through a medium the 
majority of them are comfortable with: their browser 
 Employ open source tools to avoid duplication of effort 
 Be simple to install compared with other IDSs 
This thesis describes the motivation for, design, implementation and operation of a 
system that attempts to meet the above goals. The system is deployed on and results 
generated from a university campus network. The campus network makes an ideal test 
setting since it is exposed to the risks the proposed system seeks to mitigate: the 
network is used daily by a large number of users of varying technical expertise and 
wireless LANs are open and offer anonymity to would-be intruders. 
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1.3 Thesis Structure 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: 
In Chapter 2 the history and development of computer networks is reviewed. The 
Internet and World Wide Web along with their users are given particular attention. With 
an understanding of the context in place we move on to look at Internet threats and a 
taxonomy of such threats is presented. Further evidence is presented to highlight the 
growing Internet security problem. 
In Chapter 3 the range of currently available defences for dealing with network threats 
is described including firewalls, antivirus software and intrusion detection systems. 
Because it is the focus of the work described here, particular attention is paid to the area 
of intrusion detection and a history of work in the area is presented.  
In Chapter 4 a distributed, WWW-enabled and remotely administered approach to 
intrusion detection and feedback is proposed. The design and implementation of a 
prototype system are described. Its goals (listed above) are to mitigate the threats 
described in Chapter 2 while avoiding the complexity of the systems outlined in Chapter 
3. 
In Chapter 5 results of an evaluation of the system described in Chapter 4 carried out on 
a university campus network are presented and analysed. 
Conclusions and suggestions for future work are given in Chapter 6. 
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2 The Internet Security Threat 
Having asserted in Chapter 1 that the Internet is an increasingly hostile operating 
environment, this chapter describes and analyses a representative sample of the Internet 
security threats faced by today‟s users. Before considering specific threats and the 
attacks that realise them, however, some background material on the evolution of 
networks, the Internet and the World Wide Web (WWW) is presented. An 
understanding of the Internet‟s infrastructure and its users is necessary in order that 
attacks presented later can be analysed in context. A successful attack often entails the 
subsequent installation of some malware and we examine how the latter has evolved 
with the Internet and describe some of the modern malware at the hacker‟s disposal. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.1 a brief history of computer networks, 
the Internet and the WWW is presented. The growing economic importance of the 
Internet and its general role in society today is discussed. This is followed in Section 2.2 
by a more detailed description of Internet infrastructure and the network model behind 
the Internet: TCP/IP [29]. The model‟s constituent layers and some of the major 
protocols inside those layers are examined. With the background material covered an 
exploration of Internet security threats is presented Section 2.3. Where applicable, 
attacks are related to the network layers of Section 2.2 that they target. While Section 
2.3 deals with how attackers exploit vulnerabilities and users, Section 2.4 looks at the 
malware attackers leave behind once they have gained control over a host. A summary 
and conclusions are presented in Section 2.5. 
2.1 A Brief History of Networks, the Internet and WWW  
A computer network can be defined as a distributed system consisting of a number of 
separated but interconnected computers, where those computers communicate with each 
other to exchange and share resources and information [30]. Computer networks now 
play an essential role in meeting the world‟s information gathering, processing and 
distribution requirements. To better understand how they work, we first briefly consider 
below the history of computer networks highlighting some major milestones along the 
way. This discussion leads us to the modern Internet and WWW and we examine their 
expanding cultural and economic roles. 
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2.1.1 From ARPANET to the Internet 
Designed by John Mauchly and J. Presper Eckert of the University of Pennsylvania and 
funded by the US military, the first electronic computer, ENIAC (Electronic Numerical 
Integrator and Computer) [31] was unveiled on 14th February 1946. By the 1950's 
computer usage had expanded to the extent that the ability to flexibly share information 
and resources between them was becoming a requirement and in 1954 the US Air Force 
began funding the development of one of the first wide area networks at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The result was SAGE (Semi-Automatic 
Ground Environment) a wide area network that linked radar installations [32]. It was 
deployed in 1963 and not decommissioned until 1983. One major concern for the US 
Air Force was the survivability of the network (and communications in general) in the 
face of a Soviet nuclear attack. Thus over the course of the SAGE project Paul Baran of 
the RAND (Research ANd Development) organisation was commissioned to research 
survivable communications networks. He developed the concept of packet switching 
networks and published the details in 1964 in "On Distributed Communications 
Networks" [33]. 
The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was established in 1958 by the US 
Department of Defence to develop military science and to keep pace with the Soviet 
Union's technological development. A computer network was envisioned that would 
allow ARPA agencies and researchers to collaborate and exchange information. The 
network was to be called ARPANET. When it came time to develop ARPANET Larry 
Roberts was recruited from MIT in 1966 to act as its chief architect. He adopted Baran's 
packet switching approach. ARPANET the world's first wide area packet switched 
network went live in 1969 when the first host to host message was sent from the 
University of California Los Angeles to the Stanford Research Institute. By the end of 
1969 ARPANET had four network nodes. Fifteen nodes were added during the early 
1970s, including Harvard University and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA). The addition of University College London and Norway‟s 
Royal Radar Establishment made ARPANET a global network. 
In 1983 the US military handed control of ARPANET to public authorities (after 
establishing their own MILNET network). The removal of military interest meant 
researchers could use ARPANET for broader public interests. The success of 
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ARPANET inspired the creation of other networks like CSNET, EUNET and NSFNET. 
By the 1980s there were ARPANET gateways to external networks across North 
America, Europe and in Australia. ARPANET was by now just one network in a 
network of networks and the Internet was born. A standard was required to enable 
different computers on different networks to communicate and TCP/IP [34, 35] was 
adopted. 
In 1984 the number of Internet hosts was 1000, by 1987 the number had increased to 
10,000, and in 1989 the number reached 100,000. The first dot com domain 
symbolics.com, was registered in 1985 [36]. In 1989 the first large-scale Internet worm 
[37] infected thousands of Internet hosts. ARPANET was retired in 1990 and 
universities still connected to it were moved to NSFNET. 
Before 1990 much of the Internet served as a government-subsidized research and 
educational tool for universities. The primary user groups were academic, government 
and industrial researchers [38]. There were four main applications available for users. 
The File Transfer Protocol (FTP) [39] was developed to copy files between nodes on 
the Internet. Articles and databases were shared in this way enabling collaborative 
research between different universities. E-mail has been available since the early days 
of the ARPANET. Researchers used news applications to exchange topics and ideas in 
computers, science and politics over USENET [40]. Equipped with a username and 
password users could remotely access other machines using the telnet [41] program. 
2.1.2 The Internet and WWW Explosion 
Tim Berners-Lee invented the WWW [42] in 1989 and is today the director of the 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), which oversees its continued development. The 
WWW is an architectural framework of interlinked hypertext documents accessed via 
the Internet. The WWW and Internet are not equivalent. The WWW is one of many 
Internet services. WWW applications do not change any of the underlying facilities 
provided by the Internet but rather make them easier to use through browsers. A 
browser provides a friendly GUI that makes it straightforward for beginners to access 
text, images, videos and other multimedia available on the WWW. The development of 
the WWW and browser technologies enabled and triggered the explosive growth of the 
Internet. By the end of 2008, the total number of Internet hosts was approximately 565 
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million [43]. The current IP protocol, IPv4 is set to "run out" of free IP addresses and its 
successor IPv6 is being phased in as the Internet continues to expand. 
2.1.2.1 The Internet in the Home 
Once the Internet was transferred from military to civilian control and its operation 
privatised it became much more accessible to the general public. The WWW opened up 
possibilities to many people for information gathering, social interaction, entertainment 
and self-expression over the Internet. Thus the Internet was transformed from a research 
tool into a popular medium. The Internet was no longer an academic and military 
research tool but a public utility. 
According a report by the United Nations [44], the number of Irish broadband 
subscribers was 10,600 in 2002, only 0.3% of Irish citizens. Over the following four 
years, the number increased nearly 50-fold, and was 517,300 by 2006, 12.3% of the 
population. The data from the latest report shows that by the end of 2008, the number of 
broadband subscribers in Ireland had reached 1.2 million [45]. 
As the Internet has become more important in everyday life so mobile Internet access 
has become a requirement. People are no longer satisfied with accessing the Internet 
from a fixed location, they expect to use the Internet whenever and wherever they 
require. Numerous mobile devices have been developed in recent years, laptops, PDAs 
(Personal Digital Assistant) and smart mobile phones, such as the iPhone come WiFi- 
and Internet-ready. Mobile broadband is now available for these devices. From the 
beginning of 2008, most Irish mobile service companies such as Vodafone, O2, and 
Meteor provide mobile broadband services. Data from the latest report at the end of 
2008 [45], indicated the number of users who used mobile broadband from their mobile 
phones or laptops to access the Internet was up to 200,000 in Ireland. According to the 
same report between 2008 and 2009 there was a 41% increase in wireless access points 
in cafés, airports, hotels etc. in Ireland. 
Today there are 1.6 billion Internet users around the world of varying age and levels of 
computer knowledge and security awareness. Compared with user groups before the 
1990s, current Internet users exhibit a broader age range, are less sophisticated (in the 
computer security sense), and are more demanding of rich Internet content. 
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2.1.2.2 The Internet in Business 
The WWW has revolutionised the way business is conducted. Many companies use the 
Internet as their primary means of enabling business transactions and generating 
revenue. For some, revenue is solely generated through e-commerce. For example, to 
purchase products from Dell [46] or Amazon [47] a customer must go online. The 
development of TLS/SSL cryptographic protocols used to encrypt sensitive information 
over a network was key in making such business possible. Other companies sell 
services and not products over the Internet e.g. web hosting companies will provide, for 
a fee, a hosting service to companies who do not wish to purchase and maintain their 
own hardware, such as the WildWestDomains.com [48] in U.S. and hosting365.ie [49] 
in Ireland. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) sprang up in response to the business 
opportunities arising from the Internet access requirements of both business and home 
users. The business of advertising the products and services provided by companies has 
led to the emergence of new revenue generating models. One of the most obvious and 
successful examples is Google [50]. Google provides free services to Internet users and 
revenue is generated through advertising third party products and services to those users. 
Estimates of total online retail sales for 2002 were 43 billion USD for the United States 
and 28 billion USD for the European Union [51]. At the end of the 2007, online retail 
sales were up to 175 billion USD in United States, and this number was expected to 
reach 204 billion USD at the end of the 2008 [52]. 
The Internet is also used to promote the reputation of companies and to provide support 
services to customers. Corporations and many small companies today have their own 
website. At the very least such websites provide an overview of the company and 
advertise its products. According to the 2007-2008 report of the United Nations [44], by 
the end of 2006 in Ireland, 94% of enterprises were using the Internet and 67% of 
enterprises had interactive websites. 
2.2 Network Communication Layers and Protocols 
As the Internet expanded, standardisation of the software and hardware that enabled it 
became an issue. Models of network architecture were developed and protocols were 
proposed to implement and comply with those models. In this section we concentrate on 
one particularly important model, the Internet Protocol Suite, more commonly referred 
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to as the TCP/IP model [29]. The TCP/IP model is fundamental to today's Internet and 
examining it will allow the threats covered in Section 2.3 to be analysed in context. It 
should be noted that although we focus here the TCP/IP model, others exist. One 
heavily referenced alternate model is the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference 
model [53]. The OSI model was designed in a top-down fashion and over the course of 
its lengthy standardisation process the bottom-up TCP/IP model gained widespread 
industry acceptance. Protocols associated with the TCP/IP model are the more prevalent 
today. 
2.2.1 Network Communication Layers 
Models abstract network implementation into a number of layers. Layers capture the 
function their contents serve in the overall network. In the resulting service stack each 
layer provides support to the one above and a layer need not be concerned with how the 
services below it are implemented. 
The TCP/IP model has four layers (OSI has seven). From the top down they are: the 
application, transport, Internet and link layers. To communicate over the Internet, a host 
must implement one protocol from each layer. The layers and their constituent protocols 
are described in more detail in Table 2.1. 
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The TCP/IP Model 
Layer Functions and Protocols 
Application 
The application layer is the top layer in the TCP/IP model. It contains 
the higher-level protocols that provide services directly to applications 
and common system services. The protocols in this layer include 
Telnet, FTP, SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol), SNMP (Simple 
Network Management Protocol), POP (Post Office Protocol), TLS/SSL 
(Transport Layer Security/Secure Sockets Layer), HTTP (Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol), SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) and DNS 
(Domain Name System). 
Transport 
The transport layer is responsible for encapsulating and abstracting 
data/messages into packets suitable for transfer and delivery to hosts. It 
provides end-to-end communication services for applications. There are 
two primary protocols in this layer, TCP (Transmission Control 
Protocol) and UDP (User Datagram Protocol). 
Internet 
The Internet layer is used to transport packets from the initiating host 
across network boundaries to the destination host specified by IP 
address. Packets can be injected into any network and travel 
independently of each other through different networks to their 
destination. Protocols in this layer include IP (Internet Protocol) and 
ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol). 
Link 
The link layer is the lowest layer in the model. This layer is primarily 
concerned with the network interface and the physical and logical 
components used to interconnect nodes on the Internet. Widely used 
protocols that belong to this layer include ARP (Address Resolution 
Protocol) and MAC (Media Access Control). 
 
Table 2.1 The TCP/IP Model Layers 
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2.2.2 Network Protocols 
In addition to specifying an abstract layered network framework the TCP/IP model also 
specifies a set of protocols to meet the functions expected from each layer. In network 
communication, a protocol is an agreement between the communicating parties that 
dictates the process of communication, including the syntax, semantics and 
synchronisation of messages. Protocols define the standards and conventions that 
control connections and communications. Any violation of a protocol can make 
communication difficult or impossible. Numerous protocols have been proposed and 
implemented in response to different communication requirements. Below we give a 
brief summary of some of the protocols, from the bottom-up, in the TCP/IP suite. 
Link Layer: ARP 
ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) [54] is used by the Internet Protocol (IP) in 
mapping an IP network address to a hardware address such as the Media Access Control 
(MAC) address used in Ethernet. For example, a machine will cache the MAC address 
of its gateway since that is the machine it sends packets to before they reach the Internet. 
Although the ultimate destination address of the packet is remote (given by an IP 
address) the MAC address is that of the next machine. On its journey a packet‟s MAC 
address will be rewritten as the packet traverses the Internet. MAC addresses are thus 
for short-haul routing compared to long-haul IP routing. 
Internet Layer: IP 
IP (Internet Protocol) [55] is a core protocol in the TCP/IP model. It is used for 
transmitting and receiving data across a packet-switched network. Each endpoint on the 
Internet has at least one IP address that uniquely identifies it among all endpoints. The 
task of this protocol is to deliver data from the source addressed host to the destination 
addressed host by routing packets through networks. IPv4 is the most widely used 
version today and provides a 32-bit IP address space. However as the number of 
Internet hosts increases IPv4 is approaching its end-of-life. IPv4 addresses may run out 
as soon as 2011 [56]. IPv6 is slowly displacing IPv4 and will provide a 128-bit IP 
address space. 
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Internet Layer: ICMP 
ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) [57] is a supporting protocol in the TCP/IP 
model. The operating systems of networked computers use ICMP to send error 
messages and report problems such as undelivered packets. Typical problems include 
“destination unreachable”, “router unreachable” and “requested service does not exist”. 
Transport Layer: TCP 
TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) [58] is another core protocol in the TCP/IP model. 
TCP is a higher level protocol compared to IP. It is used by computer applications to 
send data over IP and guarantee delivery. Thus while IP specifies that a packet should 
be delivered from one host to another, TCP specifies additional streaming properties 
that guarantee both delivery and order of delivery. TCP is a stateful protocol in that it 
establishes a connection between hosts. It takes responsibility for dividing a message 
into individual packets, keeping track of each packet and reassembling packets into the 
original message at the destination. IP packets can be lost or delivered out of order, TCP 
solves these issues as it requests retransmission of lost packets or rearranges out-of-
order packets. 
Transport Layer: UDP 
UDP (User Datagram Protocol) [59] is an alternative to TCP and is used to offer a 
limited delivery service that requires low transport overhead with non-guaranteed 
packet delivery. Message sending/receiving is direct, there is no prior establishment of a 
communications channel. Compared with TCP, UDP is a stateless, non-connected 
protocol. 
Application Layer: DNS 
DNS (Domain Name System) [60] is a service that translates domain names into IP 
addresses. A domain name is more meaningful and easier to remember than an IP 
address. It is in the highest layer of the TCP/IP protocol suite, and uses UDP as its 
communication protocol. 
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Application Layer: HTTP 
HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) [61] is an application protocol running on top of 
the TCP/IP model. It defines a set of rules for transferring text, images, sound, video 
and other multimedia files over the WWW.  
2.2.3 Example 
As an example of this layered architecture in action consider a web browser seeking to 
send an HTTP request to a web server. The request, being constructed by a browser, 
makes HTTP an application layer protocol. The HTTP request is sent over TCP to 
ensure it arrives at its intended destination and its constituent parts arrive in the correct 
order. A TCP connection must be established in advance of sending the request. As the 
connection is across the Internet (although TCP does not care and is independent of how 
the source and destination are addressed) the connection must be established between 
two Internet hosts identified by IP address. IP addresses are tied to physical hardware 
using ARP (although again IP does not care how the IP address is associated with a 
specific piece of hardware). 
2.3 Internet Threats and Attacks 
Not only does the Internet make available useful and/or critical services to a connecting 
user but it also turns that user‟s machine into an addressable collection of resources and 
data. These resources are increasingly targeted by criminals. In addition to making their 
hardware accessible the Internet also makes the users themselves and, potentially, their 
personal data accessible. Given the number of Internet users is approaching 1.6 billion, 
potential for financial gain is attracting growing organised criminal activity. Internet 
users are thus under threat of attack. In this section we look at an illustrative subset of 
the attacks they may face. 
A "threat" is defined by in the ISG (Internet Security Glossary) [62] as: “A potential for 
violation of security, which exists when there is a circumstance, capability, action, or 
event that could breach security and cause harm". Thus a threat is something that may 
occur and exists even in the absence of an attack. The three pillars of security are 
confidentiality, integrity and availability [63]. An “attack” is defined as an “assault on a 
system" and a successful one will breach at least one of the three pillars of security. 
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Users put in place defences to fend off attacks and lower the threat level they face on 
the Internet. Given the vast array of attacks to which Internet applications and users may 
be subjected we can examine only a sample here. We broadly classify Internet attacks 
into four categories: 
 Attacks against services 
 Attacks against applications 
 Attacks against users 
 Attacks against configuration errors  
Below we explain and give examples of each. We also reference some of the tools 
available to attackers to facilitate implementing attacks. 
2.3.1 Attacking Internet Services and Resources 
Attacks in this category are denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. In a DoS attack consumers 
are prevented from accessing a provider‟s services [64]. For a service provider this can 
result in serious financial loss. For a consumer it can, at the very least, cause 
inconvenience. DoS attacks fall into two categories: vulnerability exploiters and 
resource consumers. 
Vulnerability Exploiters 
The Ping of Death (PoD) [65] is a classic example of this kind of DoS attack from the 
1990s. It is an attack that exploits a vulnerability in the reassembly process of IP packet 
fragments to crash machines. Simple ICMP ping utilities can be used to implement this 
kind of attack and gave the attack its name although the vulnerability is in the IP and not 
in the ICMP protocol. The TCP/IP protocol allows a single IP packet to have a 
maximum size of 65535 bytes. A normal ICMP ping packet is a few bytes in size. 
However, in the attack an oversized ICMP ping packet can be sent over IP if fragmented. 
When a target machine received and reassembled the packet whose specified size was 
larger than the maximum allowed, a buffer overflow could occur. Many machines froze, 
crashed, or rebooted on receiving such a packet. This attack was anonymous because 
the source IP address could be spoofed (no connection was established). Operating 
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systems have since been patched to solve the problem by adding checks in the IP packet 
reassembly process. 
 
Figure 2.1 TCP Three-way Handshake (adapted from [66]) 
Resource Consumers 
Another variety of DoS attack aims to exhaust so many of a provider's resources 
(bandwidth, CPU cycles, memory) that it can no longer maintain adequate service levels. 
Businesses that rely on the Internet for revenue streams are threatened by this kind of 
attack. So too are public utilities implemented on IP networks. Such attacks require little 
skill to implement and the necessary tools are freely available on the Internet [25]. Over 
recent years, many web servers have been targeted by these attacks including those 
operated by Yahoo, eBay and CNN [67] causing their websites to be unreachable for a 
period and incurring significant revenue losses. In recent years, a more destructive 
version of the DoS attack has emerged: the distributed DoS (DDos) attack. In a DDoS 
attack the attacker bombards the victim from a botnet army that may contain thousands 
of nodes [68]. DDoS attacks are next to impossible to defend against given the difficulty 
faced by the victim in distinguishing between legitimate and attack traffic whose 
purpose is solely to consume resources. Botnet armies can be leased by the hour for the 
purpose of implementing such attacks. The 2007 E-Crime Watch Survey [69] reported 
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49% of 671 surveyed security executives and law enforcement officials had experienced 
DoS attacks in 2006. Even states are not immune, between April and May 2007 various 
Estonian web sites (e.g. banks, schools and government agencies) were crippled by DoS 
attacks. Early investigations suggested Russian hackers might be involved in the attacks. 
However, a 20-year-old Estonian student Dmitri Galushkevich admitted to participating 
in the attacks and was fined [70]. 
The SYN flood attack is a good example of one that targets resources. A flood of TCP 
connection requests is sent to the to the target system. In each request the SYN flag is 
set and the source IP is forged. The SYN packet is the first step of the three-way 
handshake that establishes a TCP connection (see Figure 2.1). The flood causes the 
victim‟s kernel socket table to become saturated with half-open connections as the 
operating system waits for an ACK response from a nonexistent IP address. The victim 
is soon unable to accept new legitimate connections. This is a low level attack against 
the TCP protocol of the Transport Layer in TCP/IP model. One technique that guards 
against SYN attacks is the cookie approach [71]. Under this approach, Host A initiates a 
TCP connection by sending a TCP SYN packet to the Host B (see Figure 2.1). Host B 
sends back the appropriate SYN + ACK response to Host A but discards the SYN queue 
entry from the TCP connection table. One of the values in Host B‟s response is a 
sequence number y generated by Host B. According to the TCP specification, the first 
sequence number sent by a host can be any 32 bit value. Host B carefully constructs the 
sequence number y according to certain rules, so that if a subsequent ACK response y+1 
is received by Host B, Host B will be able to authenticate it to determine whether it is a 
legitimate reply. Basically, rather than the server allocate resources it embeds the 
equivalent information in the sequence number sent to the client which will 
subsequently be returned to it. 
2.3.2 Attacking Applications 
As stated in Chapter 1, classic hacker behaviour follows a three step process: Network 
reconnaissance, host/service enumeration and finally exploitation. For each of these 
steps the hacker has a selection of tools to choose from. The target is selected during the 
network reconnaissance stage. Here tools such as nslookup and dig [21] help the 
intruder gain a high level overview of the target by querying publicly available 
information. During the second stage accessible hosts are detected and scanned for 
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services using a network scanner. Nmap [22] allows the identification of the target 
operating system and the versions of the various network services it exports. 
Vulnerabilities due to users failing to apply patches in a timely manner [14] are 
common. For example some estimates put the number of machines infected by the 
Conficker worm at 15 million [72, 73] and this despite the patch for the underlying 
problem being released two months before the worm first appeared [74]. 
Once a vulnerability has been identified the next step for the hacker is its exploitation. 
Here a library of exploits such as that provided by the Metasploit project [23] does the 
hard work. The attacker passes to Metasploit a vulnerability descriptor and specifies the 
level of control she wishes to gain over the host. Metasploit generates the payload (an 
exercise that used to require some assembly programming skills) and will even inject it 
into the target host. Once the host is controlled it may become part of a botnet and from 
then on is controllable using a DDoS toolkit such as Trinoo [25]. Once the intruder has 
control of one host and gained a foothold in the target network she typically targets 
other hosts on the same network under the assumption they contain similar 
vulnerabilities. 
An alternative to the classic attack pattern described above has also emerged in recent 
times. In a so-called “drive-by” attack a user is induced to visit a web site. The web site 
contains script that attempts to compromise the user's browser and use it as an attack 
vector for malware installation. The web site may be run by the attackers or by a 
legitimate but hacked third party. On visiting one such infecting-site researchers 
reported the installation on the visiting host of 50 malware binaries [75]. The latter 
study identified 450,000 URLs that attempted malware installation against vulnerable 
browsers. As mentioned earlier, 60% of users are not using the most secure version of 
their browser [14]. 
Whether the attacker targets a service directly or induces the user to visit a site it is 
vulnerabilities in the application that are exploited. Applications are becoming more 
complex as users demand more features. Complexity (often regarded as the enemy of 
secure code [76]) and tighter deadlines in a commercially competitive software industry 
mean bugs are introduced into software products. A bug may allow an application to 
carry out more actions than intended by design. When those actions implement an 
attack, the bug is an exploitable security vulnerability. If the application can be accessed 
across the Internet then the vulnerability is remotely exploitable. Such vulnerabilities 
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are the most serious particularly when they occur in common services such as web [77] 
and RPC [78] servers. As usual there is a wide variety of attacks that fall into this 
category. Here we look at two common and dangerous ones: buffer overflow attacks 
and SQL injection attacks. Both feature regularly in "Top 10" security flaws [79]. Their 
underlying cause is a failure to properly sanitise untrusted data. 
Buffer Overflow Attacks 
In a C/C++ program it may be possible, as a result of careless programming, to write to 
a container more data than it can hold. The lack of type safety and bounds checking in 
C/C++ means no exception is thrown or error is reported. Thus a bug in a C/C++ 
program may for example allow more user input to be written to an array than it can 
cater for. The extra data overflows the buffer and overwrites adjacent process state. 
When the adjacent state is control-flow-related an attacker may take over the process 
and cause it to execute arbitrary code. This is a buffer overflow attack. Buffer overflow 
attacks remain common vulnerabilities despite a widespread understanding of the issue. 
Typically they occur in C/C++ programs when unsafe functions are used to process user 
input and carry out no bounds checking on that input. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the attack in action where function A has just called function B. A 
stack-based four byte character buffer, here called string, is used to store data supplied 
by an untrusted source. Assuming an unsafe C/C++ string handling function e.g. 
strcpy is involved a buffer overflow attack is possible. By supplying an overly long 
input an attacker can cause the buffer to overflow and can rewrite adjacent state. Here 
that state includes a saved frame pointer “%ebp” and a return address. The return 
address is the location in memory of the instruction in A to be executed once the 
currently executing function B has completed. The frame pointer and return address are 
completely under the attacker's control. The return address may be set to point back into 
the buffer itself. The contents of the buffer are however also under the attacker's control. 
By placing in the buffer (here the buffer is small but in an attack it may be larger) 
machine executable opcodes and rewriting the return address to point into them the 
attacker can execute arbitrary code. (Unusually the code is executing on the stack and 
not in the text section of the process address space.) If the target application is running 
with elevated privileges, those privileges are inherited by the attack code. The opcodes 
or “payload” will typically launch a remote shell. Only 30-40 bytes are required to do so 
and give the attacker complete control of the host. While writing the exploit "shellcode" 
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may require some skill if done from scratch, the Metasploit Project [23, 80] provides a 
library of exploits to choose from for a variety of operating systems. The required level 
of assembly know-how is thus greatly reduced. 
 
Figure 2.2 Buffer Overflow 
The first Internet worm, the Morris Worm of 1988 [37], exploited a buffer overflow 
vulnerability in the UNIX finger daemon to infect thousands of hosts. Similar 
vulnerabilities arose in Microsoft's web server, Internet Information Services (IIS) in 
1999 and again in 2001 [81]. Because they occurred in web servers they were 
particularly harmful and led to the spread of the Code Red Worm [81]. 
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SQL Injection 
SQL injection vulnerabilities again stem from a failure to adequately sanitise user input. 
Here the victim application is typically a database behind a web application [82]. Many 
web applications take user input through a HTTP form and use it in constructing an 
SQL query to be passed to a backend database. When user input is improperly 
combined with SQL statements the potential for an SQL injection attack arises. 
Consider the code below where password is a user supplied parameter:  
statement = “select * from client where 
password = „ ” + password + “ ‟ ”;  
While the code looks innocuous and code like it is extremely common consider what 
happens when a user enters a password such as: 
 something‟ or „x‟ = „x 
The resulting SQL query is: 
 statement = “select * from client 
where password = „something‟ or „x‟ = „x‟ ”; 
This SQL statement selects and returns all rows in the table resulting in a breach of 
confidentiality. A successful SQL injection attack can cause disclosure of sensitive data, 
modification of data and even execution of arbitrary operations on the host. The 
problem is that control sequences/metacharacters present in user input are not properly 
escaped before being handed to the database. Such characters cause the database‟s SQL 
interpreter to “context switch” from a data processing mode to an instruction processing 
one. In the above example the metacharacters in question are the string delimiters „and ‟. 
User data is treated not as data but as instructions in the same way as in a buffer 
overflow attack. The threat is removed by properly escaping user input through the use 
of prepared statements. Prepared statements hand the escaping problem over to the 
database. Since it knows its metacharacters it is best placed to escape them. For example 
a prepared statement could fix the above problem: 
statement = “select * from client where password = ? ”; 
statement.setString (1, password); 
 25 
 
resultSet = statement.executeQuery(); 
The “ ? ” is a placeholder, when the query is executed, a value will be supplied and 
replaces the “ ? ” in the query. Passing input to the statement as a parameter is 
sometimes referred to as a parameterised query. 
2.3.3 Social Engineering Attacks 
Social engineering techniques are used by attackers to target not technical 
vulnerabilities in applications but Internet users themselves. One approach in this 
category is phishing. Often initiated with an email request to check sensitive 
information such as an online bank balance the email purports to come from a 
trustworthy entity. It contains a link that if followed leads to a fake website. The fake 
website is constructed by attackers to look identical to the authentic one. Any 
usernames and passwords entered are submitted to the attacker. The FBI reported in 
2008 that 265 million USD was lost to phishing and Internet fraud by US citizens [83]. 
Social engineering attacks can also be used to trick users into installing malware such as 
viruses, spyware, adware and even rootkits. The "ILOVEYOU" [84] and "Anna 
Kournikova" [85] viruses are cases in point. Delivered to victims as an email attachment, 
when opened a Visual Basic script was executed. The script emailed itself to the 
victim's contacts (extracted from their address book) and made changes to the host. 
Another common approach to inducing users into installing malware uses malicious 
websites that offer "free content" that can only be viewed with the supplied codec. The 
"codec" is in fact trojan software that once installed incorporates the host into a botnet 
army, installs a backdoor, spyware etc. 
Application attacks and social engineering attacks may be combined. In the drive-by 
met earlier the victim is induced to visit some website, again perhaps by clicking on a 
link in an email. On following the link their browser is scanned for vulnerabilities by 
the malicious web server. Any weaknesses discovered are exploited and malware 
installed [75]. 
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2.3.4 Attacking Misconfigurations 
Lastly we consider attacks that exploit misconfigured networks and software. These 
attacks target common mistakes or omissions by users and network administrators. The 
means exist for secure system configuration but the user does not know how to apply 
them or is unaware of the risk of not doing so. The threat is obviously highest when 
novice or busy users are working with complex systems. Below we look at some 
common examples that illustrate the problem. 
Networks 
Domain Name Services (DNS) are regularly insecurely configured. A given domain 
will typically be managed by multiple name servers. Several are used for redundancy: if 
one goes down another name server can replace it. Thus name servers need to be kept 
synchronised and they do so by one requesting a zone transfer from the next. Zone 
transfers should only occur between internal name servers. It is often the case however 
that an attacker can connect to a corporate DNS server and successfully request from it 
a zone transfer. This results in detailed information on the organisation of the internal 
network (host names, IP addresses, software versions, hardware information) etc. being 
made public. Such details can aid an attacker in targeting weak points in the network. 
The problem is solved by simply configuring DNS to only transmit zones between 
designated primary and backup servers. 
Wireless networks are also often vulnerable, being left open or configured to use WEP. 
WEP keys can be broken in a matter of minutes. In one sense using WEP is more 
dangerous than employing no encryption because it offers a false sense of security. 
Once a WEP key is broken, bandwidth is open to hijacking and network traffic can be 
sniffed. Modern wireless routers all offer the more secure and only slightly more 
difficult to configure WPA encryption option. Relatively few users employ it however. 
The TK Maxx credit card theft in 2007 [20] clearly illustrates the wireless network 
threat. In the largest network security data breach in history 45.7 million debit and 
credit card records were stolen. The techniques used by the intruders to hack the TK 
Maxx wireless network were simple. War-driving [86] detected the vulnerable wireless 
network and was followed by key-breaking and network sniffing [87]. As a result of the 
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weak encryption, initial hacking and decrypting of the stolen data was a relatively 
simple task. 
Research carried out by Magee [88] reveals the scale of the problem in Dublin, Ireland. 
On a war-driving exercise conducted over a return journey from the Dublin City 
University (DCU) campus to the city centre, 3143 wireless access points were revealed. 
(The areas covered included the Irish Financial Services Centre.) 25% of access points 
were openly accessible and applied no encryption whatsoever while another 60% relied 
on the easily broken WEP standard. Many access points also broadcast the network's 
SSID (Service Set IDentifier) and gave it a meaningful name such as “Boardroom” and 
“Manager's Office”. 
An Internet facing firewall for a large network may have to deal with extremely large 
volumes of data and in the interests of maximising throughput certain features may be 
disabled by default. Once such example relates to packet fragmentation. Rather than 
having the firewall hold packet fragments temporarily and reassemble them before 
making an allow/deny decision it may blindly forward fragmented packets to their 
destination, leaving the host to make the decision. This firewall evasion technique is a 
favourite of hackers. Nmap allows the option of conducting scans using fragmented 
packets.  
Software 
Personal host-based firewalls require configuration. A default ruleset may allow all 
inbound and outbound traffic in order to get a user up and running rapidly. A README 
file advising rule modifications may never be read or if it is read may not be understood. 
(Linux distributions may install a reasonably configured firewall but by default the 
Linux firewall, the netfilter/iptables suite, allows all inbound and outbound connections.) 
As software grows increasingly complex even experienced network administrators can 
make errors in deploying it securely. The sendmail program that implements an SMTP 
service for email routing and delivery on Unix systems is an example. Given its 
complexity, it may be deployed with debug support enabled. Debug support can be 
exploited to execute instructions on the host server. The Morris worm, in addition to 
exploiting a buffer overflow, also sought out debug sendmail installations and exploited 
them to propagate [89]. Mistakes in web service configuration are another source of 
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attack [90, 91]. Configuration errors in database applications such as unchanged default 
database administrator passwords are also common. 
In summary, misconfigurations often stem from default settings chosen for user 
friendliness and convenience rather than security. Appropriately secure configuration 
takes understanding and requires regular revisiting.  
2.4 Malware 
An attack is often only the first step for a criminal. The real intent is the subsequent 
installation of malware which allows their presence to remain undetected and permanent 
(even after the original vulnerability is patched). Malware can be generally defined as "a 
piece of software inserted into an information system to cause harm to that system or 
other systems, or to subvert them for use other than that intended by their owners" [28]. 
Below we distinguish between how malware propagates and its capabilities. 
Propagation 
Up until the 1990s the malware world was dominated by viruses and trojans. A virus 
attaches itself to a host program and generally requires the activation of the host 
program or some user intervention in order to propagate. A trojan is malware disguised 
as some useful application the user is tricked into installing. The user intervention 
required for the spread of viruses and trojans is often incentivised through social 
engineering techniques (as mentioned in section 2.3.3). The propagation vectors (i.e. the 
means by which the virus/trojan spreads) include email (ILOVEYOU and Anna 
Kournikova), P2P networks, USB devices, shared network drives etc. An interesting 
recent take on propagation is the drive-by attack mentioned above where rather than 
bringing the malware to the user, the user is brought to the malware and a vulnerable 
browser is exploited to install a payload. 
While a virus requires a host and activation of that host in order to spread a worm does 
not and combines self-replication and self-propagation abilities. With the rise of the 
Internet, worms can spread rapidly by exploiting vulnerabilities in common network 
services, infecting thousands of machines in a matter of hours. Examples of well known 
worms include Code Red [81], Slammer [92] and more recently Conficker [74]. 
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Capabilities 
Once an attacker gains a foothold on a host she typically embeds software in it such that 
long after the original vulnerability is patched she can maintain a presence on the 
machine. The host is then under remote and, depending on the privilege level at which 
the malware executes, total control by the attacker. Data can be encrypted and the owner 
held to ransom. Spyware such as keyloggers may be installed in order to steal 
confidential details such as passwords for online banks and other information suitable 
for identity theft. Industrial and international espionage can be implemented in the same 
way (in 2006 Michael Haephrati and his wife Ruth were extradited from Britain to 
Israel for creating a trojan used for espionage [93]). The owner may not be targeted 
directly but rather their machine may be incorporated into a botnet and become an 
unwitting player in a subsequent DDoS attack. Nowadays malware is typically general 
purpose in that it can be put to a variety of uses. Interestingly the attacker no longer 
contacts the malware directly in order to give it instructions but rather the malware 
contacts some central point e.g. a web site where its instructions have been posted. This 
helps ensure attacker anonymity. 
As malware has evolved the high profile if "harmless" mass-spreading worms and 
viruses of previous years are being replaced by stealthier varieties more suitable for 
supporting criminal activity. The trend has been towards "rootkits". A rootkit is a 
sophisticated hacking tool that can provide permanent administrator-level access to a 
host. Once a rootkit has been installed, it provides the attacker with administrator level 
access to the system and thus provides complete control over it. What differentiates a 
rootkit from traditional malware is the level at which it operates: kernel level. A rootkit 
is thus part of the operating system and can interfere with its operation. This low level 
of operation presents significant challenges to host-based malware scanners: asking a 
rootkit-infected operating system whether it is infected with malware (through a 
userland malware detector) is pointless since all answers returned by the operating 
system are modifiable by the rootkit. Thus a rootkit can hide its existence and go 
undetected by users. The rootkit at kernel-level can subvert the monitoring and 
reporting mechanisms of a system, evade host-based security tools and rewrite logged 
system behaviour. Rootkit software is easy to obtain and can be downloaded freely [24]. 
Given their stealth and the difficulty faced by host-based software in detecting their 
presence it makes sense that third party feedback from its peers on how a host is 
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behaving on the network is valuable. The system described in Chapter 4 makes such 
information available. 
The Malware Cost 
The annual malware cost to US businesses was put at 67 billion USD by one report [26]. 
US consumers paid almost 4 billion USD over two years for malware removal [15]. 
ISPs pay when dealing with infected hosts on their networks: there may be degraded 
service for legitimate ISP customers if the infected hosts are generating large volumes 
of network traffic. The ISP may become blacklisted and lose reputation if its hosts have 
been reported for generating spam [94]. Companies suffer financially when forced to 
over-provision in terms of bandwidth and processing power in order to deal with the 
DDoS threat. Critical infrastructures running on IP networks are also at risk: in 2003 the 
Slammer worm infected a nuclear power plant's safety monitor in the US (a contractor 
had connected to their home network from a host in the plant leading to infection) [28]. 
Even the CERN particle accelerator has been hacked [95]. 
2.5 Summary 
In order to understand the Internet security threat it is necessary to have an 
understanding of its underlying technology and users. This chapter gave a brief history 
and overview of computer network development in Section 2.1. The explosion of the 
Internet and WWW were also covered. Network communication layers and protocols 
were examined in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3 we surveyed specific Internet security 
threats and the attacks that realise those threats. Attacks were analysed as belonging to 
different categories and associated with corresponding network communication layers 
in order to be seen in context. In general attacks have been moving up the network stack 
over time, no longer targeting protocols but users and applications. Lastly in Section 2.4 
we looked at the malware attackers install on victim machines and its capabilities.  
In response to this range of threats a wide array of defences has been proposed. In 
Chapter 3 we examine those defences. Given intrusion detection is the focus of this 
thesis the majority of the chapter is devoted to exploring the history of that field. The 
latest intrusion detection approaches and example applications will also be presented. 
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3 The Defences 
An overview of the typical threats against which computer networks, applications and 
users must defend themselves was presented in the previous chapter. This chapter will 
describe the typical forms those defences take: firewalls, antivirus software and 
intrusion detection systems. All defences are designed to prevent, detect, identify or 
remove threats. Each form of defence has different functionality and features to protect 
resources from certain kinds of threat. A firewall protects computers or computer 
networks from unwanted or malicious connection attempts and network traffic. 
Antivirus software focuses on protecting the computer system and applications from 
infiltration across the network by malware. Another defence is intrusion detection 
applications, which are used to detect, prevent and react to intrusions or threats against 
computers or networks. In summary, a firewall aims to prevent intrusion, antivirus 
software tries to detect infection during or after the fact and an intrusion detection 
system attempts to detect and respond to attacks in real time. 
Since the focus of this thesis is intrusion detection, this chapter focuses on the 
development of intrusion detection systems and technology. In addition to describing 
the different approaches to intrusion detection, a short history of the area is presented 
and some major events in the area are mentioned. In line with the goals outlined in 
Chapter 1 our focus is on open source and free systems but some commercial intrusion 
detection systems will also be referenced. 
The chapter is structured as follows: In Section 3.1 firewalls are discussed. This is 
followed in Section 3.2 by a description of antivirus software. Section 3.3 provides a 
more detailed description of intrusion detection technology. A brief history of intrusion 
detection is first presented. The primary components of intrusion detection applications 
are presented next. With reference to the latter components intrusion detection 
applications can be broken down into different categories. These different approaches 
are then compared and their advantages and disadvantages discussed. A description of 
several modern intrusion detection systems is also presented. The chapter concludes 
with a summary in Section 3.4. 
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3.1 Firewalls 
A firewall is a form of defence for protecting computers and computer networks. A 
formal definition from the Internet Security Glossary [62] states that a firewall is: “An 
internetwork gateway that restricts data communication traffic to and from one of the 
connected networks (the one said to be “inside” the firewall) and thus protects that 
network‟s system resources against threats from the other network (the one that is said 
to be “outside” the firewall).” This definition is network-oriented. Today a firewall in 
general is a set of computer applications designed to protect a host or network from 
network-based security threats such as unauthorized access attempts, unwanted 
connections etc. The rapid growth of the Internet and the mobility of its users has meant 
a firewall is more important than ever in protecting users. Today a firewall can be 
implemented in hardware, software, or as a combination of both. A firewall enforces 
that part of a business‟s security policy that is designed to protect hosts and computer 
networks such as corporate LANs. Home user PCs must also be protected by a firewall 
when connected to the Internet. Thus there are two firewall types: network-based and 
host-based. Both kinds of firewall are presented in next two sections. 
 
Figure 3.1 Firewalls Locations 
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3.1.1 Network-based Firewall 
A network-based firewall is the computer or set of computers that inspects all traffic 
passing between untrusted networks such as the Internet and trusted networks such as 
internal networks. This type of firewall can be installed at a single location e.g. on a 
computer connected to routers and switches. Multiple firewalls can also be installed in a 
corporate network to protect subnets with different security requirements.  
Network-based firewalls examine both incoming and outgoing packets to determine 
whether to forward them toward their destination or to drop them. To install, configure 
and maintain network-based firewalls is one of a security administrator‟s most 
important tasks. The principal role of a firewall is to provide a protective barrier 
between external, potentially untrusted sources of traffic and internal networks or 
servers. Figure 3.1 (adapted from [64]) shows the typical sites where network firewalls 
are located. An external network-based firewall is placed at the edge of a local or 
corporate network, just inside the boundary router. One or more internal network-based 
firewalls can also be deployed and are used to protect different enterprise LAN 
networks and servers. The area between external and internal firewalls is called the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). One or more networks or devices, which require external 
connectivity but need some protection, are located in the DMZ region.  
In Figure 3.1, two DMZs are established: external DMZ and internal DMZ. Web servers 
that need less protection because less critical information is located on them can be 
placed in an external DMZ. However host-based firewalls are required to protect these 
web servers. The external firewall provides protection for the internal DMZ allowing 
access to remotely accessible services and also provides a basic level of protection for 
the remainder of the network. Internal firewalls have stricter filtering capabilities 
compared to the external firewall, in order to protect inside servers from external attacks. 
Internal firewalls provide strength-in-depth and have the ability to defend against 
potential attacks from within the internal DMZ to the remainder of the network and 
from the remainder of the network to the DMZ area. Internal firewalls also have the 
ability to protect internal networks from inside attacks between internal networks. These 
firewalls are necessary to again provide defence-in-depth and to resist insider attacks 
since there is little point in securing the perimeter if anonymous attacks are allowed 
from an internal wireless network against other internal networks. 
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3.1.2 Host-based Firewall 
A host-based firewall is an application used to secure an individual host. Many 
operating systems provide this kind of application. Host-based firewalls can be used to 
protect individual servers on corporate intranets such as a database server. They can be 
specifically configured for the server environment, such as to only accept 
communication on port 1433 for SQL Server or block all ports except 80 for a web 
server whereas a network-based firewall has to consider the entire protected network. 
User workstations can themselves run host-based firewall applications to restrict access 
to the services that may be on by default. 
The personal firewall is a kind of host-based firewall. It controls the network traffic 
between a personal computer and the Internet or local network. Host-based firewalls or 
personal firewalls are essential given the mobility of modern users. Using a laptop from 
a workplace WLAN is presumably safer than using one in a public place such as an 
Internet café. In the former setting we place trust in the corporate firewalls, network 
administrators and in the other users of the network. In the latter setting we cannot 
afford to do so. Host-based firewalls or personal firewalls can give users a level of 
protection in a public place setting. 
3.1.3 Packet Filtering 
Packet filtering is a function of firewalls that examines each packet entering or leaving 
the protected hosts or networks and accepts, drops or rejects it based on pre-defined 
rules. Filtering rules can be relatively difficult to configure for non-technical, average 
users. Where packets match rules, they will be accepted (forwarded as normal), dropped 
(discarded silently) or rejected (discarded and responded to with an error). If there is no 
match to any rule then a default action will be taken. 
Packets are typically filtered based on the header information within each packet such 
as the TCP and IP header contents. The header information which the user can draw 
upon in order to define rules includes the source IP address, the destination IP address, 
the source port, the destination port, the protocol, the source network etc. An example 
of a packet filter rule set from the Linux firewall iptables is shown in Table 3.1. In the 
first line, all input packets directed towards the HTTPS web application (port 443) on 
the IP address 136.206.18.95 are accepted. The next four lines are use to reject all SQL 
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SERVER database access (port 1433), HTTP access (port 80), SSH access (port 22) and 
FTP access (port 20, 21) on the same machine. The sixth line drops all packets from a 
suspicious IP address. The seventh line is use to hide the web server from ICMP 
requests by dropping all ICMP packets. The last line is configured as default rule: reject 
all input packets if no previous rule matched. In iptables the order of the rules is 
important, once a rule matches a packet, the action indicated in the rule will be 
implemented. 
iptables -A INPUT -d 136.206.18.95 -p tcp --dport 443 -j ACCEPT 
iptables -A INPUT -d 136.206.18.95 -p tcp --dport 1433 -j REJECT 
iptables -A INPUT -d 136.206.18.95 -p tcp --dport 80 -j REJECT 
iptables -A INPUT -d 136.206.18.95 -p tcp --dport 22 -j REJECT 
iptables -A INPUT -d 136.206.18.95 -p tcp --dport 20:21 -j REJECT 
iptables -A INPUT -s 61.164.117.35 -j DROP 
iptables -A INPUT -d 136.206.18.95 -p icmp -j DROP 
… 
iptables -A INPUT -j REJECT 
 
Table 3.1 iptables rules 
Stateless Packet Filtering 
Table 3.1 shows a typical stateless packet filtering rule set, which does not take into 
account the “context” of packets such as whether they belong to an established 
connection. This type of packet filtering takes no account of whether a packet is part of 
an existing stream (it stores no information on connection “state”). Instead, it filters 
each packet based only on information contained in the packet itself. 
Stateful Packet Filtering 
Stateful packet filtering, however, makes filtering decisions not only on the rule sets but 
also on the state of the corresponding connection. An active table of all in progress 
sessions is maintained during stateful packet filtering, called a connection state table 
[96]. Table 3.2 shows a simple connection state table. Each entry is a tracked TCP 
connection in states of new, established or closed. Once a connection-establishing 
packet is received with the SYN flag set, an entry is created with a state called new. The 
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received ACK will be authenticated with data in the state table, if the authentication is 
successful, the state of the entry will be updated. The same process will be gone through 
when the connection is ended. All incoming packets are compared to this table to assist 
in access control decisions. Compared to stateless packet filtering, stateful packet 
filtering is more powerful and has more information available when making an access 
decision. For example, with stateful packet filtering, the ACK scan can be effectively 
avoided. Stateful packet filtering can differentiate between valid and faked ACK 
packets by checking for the corresponding entry in the connection state table and 
comparing sequence numbers. If there is no such entry or sequence numbers are not 
correct, all invalid ACK packets will be dropped. 
 
Source 
Address 
Source 
Port 
Destination 
Address 
Destination 
Port 
Flags 
Sequence 
Number 
… 
Connection 
State 
192.168.1.66 1056 137.59.26.57 80 SYN … … New 
192.168.1.7 3645 14.36.96.74 80 SYN&ACK … … Established 
192.168.1.155 4895 83.18.72.92 25 FIN … … Closed 
217.36.59.66 7836 192.168.1.95 80 SYN&ACK … … Established 
25.79.24.11 4514 192.168.1.95 80 SYN&ACK … … Established 
 
Table 3.2 Connection State Table (adapted from [96]) 
3.1.4 Proxy Server 
A firewall acting as a proxy server intercepts all packets entering and leaving the 
protected network. For the packets leaving the protected network, the proxy replaces the 
source IP address with its own IP address and forwards them, in order to keep protected 
hosts and networks behind it anonymous for security. It can hide the true IP addresses 
of hosts in protected networks. Outside machines such as remote web servers can only 
communicate with the proxy server instead of every host on the internal network. A 
proxy server acts on behalf of the protected host. The typical location of the proxy 
server is shown in Figure 3.1. A proxy server can effectively hide internal IP address 
information in that it transparently replaces the origin address of traffic coming through 
it before passing the traffic to the Internet. 
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3.1.5 Summary 
Firewalls are essential for restricting access to specific services for protected hosts or 
networks. They are also useful for auditing as it is possible to log all through traffic 
locally or remotely. 
Firewalls also have their limitations [97]. They must be securely configured. They 
cannot protect any service or host to which access has been authorised. If an accessible 
application has flaws, the firewall cannot prevent an attack. The firewall also cannot 
stop attacks that bypass the firewall, such as separate dial-out or dial-in services in a 
corporation‟s internal LAN. Attackers could also break the weak WEP [18] encryption 
of a WLAN and access internal servers through the trusted WLAN instead of across 
firewalls. Another example that bypasses the firewall is where portable devices such as 
laptops and PDAs may become infected outside the network and once plugged back into 
the protected network are erroneously trusted. Malware may not be the cause of the 
internal attack, an employee may take part in an insider attack. Also firewalls provide 
no protection against application attacks such as browser exploits and social engineering 
attacks. 
Many personal firewalls do not provide clear feedback for users and the fact that they 
are under attack is lost and so too is an important opportunity to raise security 
awareness. Furthermore, firewall logs may show information on the behaviour of other 
machines on the network. That behaviour, which may indicate the presence of malware, 
is not conveyed automatically to the owners of those machines.  
A survey in 2007 showed that only one in seven Australian online users have firewalls 
[12]. Configuration of firewalls is increasingly complex as more applications wish to act 
as servers or make outbound Internet connections and an improperly configured firewall 
allows attackers to break into the network [98]. Also numerous and repetitive firewall-
related security questions [99, 100] may result in users disabling security features 
altogether. 
3.2 Antivirus Software 
According to the Internet Security Glossary a virus can be formally defined as “A 
hidden, self-replicating section of computer software, usually malicious logic, that 
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propagates by infecting –i.e., inserting a copy of itself into and becoming part of – 
another program. A virus cannot run by itself; it requires that its host program be run to 
make the virus active.” [62]. With the Internet explosion and the increasing use of the 
Internet by millions of users, today the term “virus” means more than the latter 
definition constructed almost ten years ago. Today an “average” computer and Internet 
user commonly uses the term virus to refer to a variety of malware including adware 
and spyware, which do not have the required reproductive ability (but do often exhibit 
similarly malicious intentions). In general malware, including viruses have evolved to 
become the rootkits covered in the previous chapter. 
Viruses and worms are often confused too. A virus requires that a host program be 
executed in order that the viral code be activated while a worm requires no host. It can 
propagate from one computer to the next over a network or the Internet by exploiting 
security flaws in common services (e.g. a web server). In 2006 65% of respondents to 
the CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey [101], had experienced viruses in 
2006 and 16 million USD was lost to virus contamination. 
As the term virus now refers to a broad range of malware so “antivirus” software refers 
to software that detects more than the presence of viruses. The meaning of “antivirus” 
has also expanded to meet this more general definition. In general antivirus software is a 
computer application that is designed to search a computer system for any known or 
potential computer viruses. As Internet use grew and attracted millions of business and 
personal users, antivirus applications became a growing industry. Antivirus software 
now can detect, prevent and remove adware, spyware and other forms of malware such 
as backdoors left behind by worms or trojans. There are many successful antivirus 
software products such as Norton AntiVirus from Symantec Corporation [102] and 
McAfee‟s VirusScan [103].  
Antivirus software is one of the earliest forms of computer defence. The first antivirus 
application “Reaper” [104] appeared soon after the first computer virus “Creeper”. It 
was developed by Bob Thomas and enhanced by Ray Tomlinson in 1971 [105]. Since 
then, antivirus applications have been used to protect computer system. Various 
strategies have been used by antivirus applications to search for and identify viruses. 
Methods are usually signature- or behaviour-based. 
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3.2.1 Signature-based detectors 
Most antivirus applications use the signature-based approach because of its simplicity. 
They define and create a group of signatures capturing the specific attributes of known 
computer viruses. Signatures take the form of a database that includes viral opcodes, 
messages which viruses generate and file types they install. Generic signatures are used 
to look for unknown or potentially malicious opcodes (since viruses are usually 
polymorphic, detectors often look for a general decryption routine). Today antivirus 
software has become the first choice in personal defence and is installed immediately 
after the operating system on personal computers. It is up to the user to regularly update 
virus signatures.  
3.2.2 Behaviour-based detectors 
Another common approach used by antivirus applications is behaviour-based detection. 
This approach enables antivirus applications to monitor the behaviour of programs on a 
local computer to look for suspicious actions that violate general policies. For example, 
a program attempting to write data to into an executable program could be deemed 
suspicious behaviour. This approach has the potential to protect against unknown 
viruses showing up on a local system. However, the behaviour of non-malicious 
applications can change over time, and this approach can generate large numbers of 
false positives. ThreatFire [106] uses a behaviour-based approach. 
3.2.3 Summary  
Antivirus software is well-suited to detecting, preventing and removing known 
malicious software, such as viruses and worms. It can be scheduled to examine an entire 
system on a regular basis. 
Antivirus software has its drawbacks. Firstly, virus signatures can obviously only be 
created and updated after the virus has been released and captured and analysed [107]. 
Users can be infected before updating to the latest signature set. Secondly, when 
antivirus software scans for viruses, it may significantly diminish the performance of 
the system and be disabled because of it. Viruses are now polymorphic and what 
signature detectors look for is the decryption routine. However code obfuscation 
techniques can make even the decryption routine difficult to identify. 
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3.3 Intrusion Detection 
Intrusion detection technology is commonly considered the third form of computer and 
network defence after antivirus software and firewall applications. Intrusion detection is 
defined in the Internet Security Glossary [62] as “A security service that monitors and 
analyzes system events for the purpose of finding, and providing real-time or near real-
time warning of attempts to access system resources in an unauthorized manner.” The 
unauthorised manipulation or access can compromise the confidentiality, integrity or 
availability of resources. The process of detection takes place by gathering and 
analyzing information from various sources within a computer or across a network for 
signs of intrusion. Evidence of intrusion can be extracted from system log files, system 
or user activities and network traffic. 
 Many network and security administrators implement intrusion detection by manually 
inspecting the logs of antivirus software and firewalls. They constantly check system 
and security log files and examine LAN traffic for actions of suspicious intent, known 
malware and unauthorized applications. By contrast an intrusion detection system (IDS) 
is a software application that automatically performs intrusion detection tasks such as 
inspecting system changes and sniffing network packets. A typical IDS is developed 
with the ability to detect a probable intrusion, log relevant information to files or 
databases, alert the administrator and deploy countermeasures to reduce the impact of 
an attack. Reactive measures can be implemented by the IDS alone or with the aid of 
other security tools such as firewalls. 
An IDS can be host-based if it protects a single host by monitoring the configuration 
files of the system, security logs, user activities and so on. An IDS can also be network-
based if it monitors network traffic. Some IDSs employ a combination of the two 
approaches in order to protect a networked host. IDSs can also be compared in terms of 
their detection mechanisms. The intrusion can be identified either by matching captured 
data against patterns or signatures of known attacks or comparing activities against a 
“normal” threshold. More details will be presented in the following sections. 
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3.3.1 A Brief History 
The concept of IDS has been explored in the face of an increasing number of attacks on 
computers, major networks and applications. Below a timeline of major events over the 
history of intrusion detection is presented. 
1980 – 1989 
The notion of intrusion detection was introduced in Anderson‟s paper “Computer 
Security Threat Monitoring and Surveillance” in 1980 [108]. In this paper, the concepts 
of threat and attack were defined and an approach to auditing data was proposed to 
recognize them. This paper is regarded as providing the foundation for later intrusion 
detection application design and development. 
The first IDS was developed between 1983 and 1986 by Denning and Neumann [109]. 
Called the Intrusion Detection Expert System (IDES), it used statistical anomaly 
detection. In 1983, a U.S. government project was launched by the Stanford Research 
Institute (SRI) International [110] led by Denning, the senior staff scientist of SRI. This 
new effort targeted intrusion detection development. Audit trails of government 
computer users were analysed and profiles created. The first functional IDS prototype, 
IDES was developed by SRI in 1984. Denning was one of the main developers of this 
system and the details of this system were included in her paper “An Intrusion 
Detection Model” [109] published in 1987. IDES was a real-time intrusion detection 
expert system, which had the ability to detect system penetrations, break-ins and abuses. 
The detection was implemented by looking for behavioural deviations of system usage 
based on profiles which represented the normal behaviour of the system in terms of 
statistical models.  
In 1988, another IDS was developed by the Haystack project at the Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory (LLNL) at the University of California Davis for the U.S. Air 
Force, called the Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS) [111]. DIDS extended 
existing IDS to monitor hosts across a small network. This system detected intrusions 
by analyzing audit data against defined attack patterns. The audit data was produced 
based on the raw events collected from each host, such as file accesses, system calls, 
process executions and logins. A commercial IDS, Stalker, was released in 1989 by 
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Haystack Labs, a company formed by the developers from the Haystack project. Stalker 
was based on DIDS.  
1990 – 1999 
The first network intrusion detection application, Network Security Monitor (NSM) 
[112], was developed by Todd Heberlein, who was a student at the University of 
California Davis and also participated in the development of DIDS. NSM analysed 
network traffic as the source of audit data. The idea of hybrid intrusion detection was 
subsequently introduced by Heberlein having worked on both NSM and the Haystack 
project [112]. 
In 1994, the first commercially available network intrusion detection device, NetRanger 
Sensor, was produced by the Wheel Group. The NetRanger Sensor was a network 
device that filtered suspicious activities based on a signature library. Cisco Systems 
bought Wheel Group in 1998. The NetRanger Sensor and software were subsequently 
integrated in the Cisco Router.  
Snort, an open source libpcap [113] -based network IDS was developed in 1998 [13]. 
2000 – Present 
IDSs have steadily grown more important in computer and network security. The 2007 
E-Crime Watch Survey [69] showed 81% of 671 surveyed security executives and law 
enforcement officials were using network-based IDS and 71% of them were using host-
based IDS. 
3.3.2 Primary Components 
Although numerous varieties exist, every IDS is composed of three functional 
components. These components are: data sensors, analysis engine and management 
console [64]. An IDS can be categorised in terms of the location of data sensors and the 
methodology used by the analysis engine to detect intrusions. Details of these three 
components are as follows. 
Data Sensors 
Data sensors are responsible for data collection and forwarding data to the analysis 
engine. The source of the input for the data sensors could be any part of an operating 
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system or application, such as user and system activity, log files, system call traces etc.. 
Another important source of information is network packets. The collected data may 
contain evidence of attacks and potential intrusions. The collected data is transferred to 
the analysis engine for further examining. 
The locations of data sensors vary according to the information they collect. Based on 
this location, the IDS can be classified into host-based IDS, network-based IDS and 
hybrid IDS. With a host-based IDS, the data sensors are installed on the host and 
concentrate on collecting data on the host activities and states, such as system calls, 
application logs, file-system modifications etc. With a network-based IDS, the data 
sensors are installed at a strategic point such as a computer connecting to a hub, 
network switch or router in order to monitor the entire traffic of the network. A hybrid 
IDS combines the two approaches. It distributes data sensors to network hosts in order 
to collect both host behaviour and network traffic. More details on these approaches are 
presented below. 
Analysis Engine 
The analysis engine receives input from data sensors and is responsible for analyzing 
the input and determining whether an intrusion has or is taking place. The analysis 
engine also records possible malicious events in a database. The output of the analysis 
engine could be an alert to the identified threat delivered to the network administrator. 
The output may also recommend responses to the detected intrusions. 
The analysis engine can use different mechanisms to detect intrusions. Based on the 
mechanisms, the IDS can be separated into signature detection IDS and anomaly 
detection IDS. Signature detection identifies intrusions based on a group of 
predetermined attack signatures. Anomaly detection identifies intrusions based on a 
threshold derived from statistical evaluations of normal computer host activities and/or 
normal network traffic. Both detection techniques are presented below 
Management Console 
The management console provides the User Interface (UI) to end users. The end user 
uses this console to configure the IDS, control the sensors and review the output of the 
analysis engine.  
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3.3.3 Signature Detection vs. Anomaly Detection 
Two detection techniques are currently used by all IDSs: signature detection and 
anomaly detection. Neither are perfect and some IDSs use both approaches to enhance 
the accuracy of detection. Both detection techniques are described in this section along 
with their advantages and disadvantages. 
Signature Detection  
Signature detection is the most popular detection technique used by IDSs. The approach 
is also know as misuse, rule, pattern and policy violation detection. This technique 
attempts to detect intrusive activity by matching observed events or behaviour to a set 
of rules or attack patterns [114][115]. Thus, at the core of this technique is a set of 
signatures of known harmful activities such as failed login attempts, specific command 
or program execution profiles, attempted file accesses and network traffic. Those 
signatures may include a list of all known unacceptable actions of system users or 
packet contents associated with known attacks. 
Advantages: Once a signature database and rule set are created, recognizing a threat can 
be simply implemented by pattern matching [116]. Since all signatures are created to 
match known malicious activities and threats, detection accuracy is assured and the 
number of false-positives is kept low. As a result countermeasures can be applied with 
confidence. Given these advantages, signature detection has been widely used in 
research, commercial and open source applications such as Snort [117]. Vital to their 
success is the establishment of a new signature immediately on the identification of a 
new threat. 
Disadvantages: This technique, like the same antivirus approach, suffers from an 
inability to recognize previously unobserved attacks because of the absence of the new 
attack‟s signature [118]. In order to have the best detection ability, the database has to 
be updated and some users must be victims in order for a signature to be created. Along 
with the increased size of the signature database and the rule set, detection performance 
can be negatively impacted by matching against large amounts of data. In an effort to 
alleviate this problem, only the most common signatures may be placed on the list to 
keep performance efficient. In order to not decrease detection reliability, generic 
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signatures or wildcards can be created to detect more than one event, but at the cost of 
an increase in the number of false positives. 
Anomaly Detection 
The first anomaly detection IDS was proposed in 1985 by Dr. Dorothy E. Denning 
[109]. Intrusive activities are defined as anomalous activities [119]. The aim of anomaly 
detection is to detect anomalous activities which deviate from established accepted 
thresholds. Thresholds can be established based on statistical evaluations of a collection 
of data over a period of time. 
Generally, training data is collected from a host or a network and observable events that 
are typically collected and measured and for example login times of a single user during 
an hour, a count of login failures during a minute, total time consumed by a program, 
network traffic. It must be ensured that no unacceptable activities occur during the 
sampling period (may be problematic if realistic data is to be gathered). Thresholds can 
be quantified as a number, a percentage or a number of standard deviations. With such 
systems, often anomalous and normal behaviour cannot be clearly differentiated. An 
appropriate threshold can reduce the number of false positives (where normal activities 
are classified as anomalous activities), and false negatives (where anomalous activities 
are classified as normal activities). See Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2 Threshold 
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Advantages and Disadvantages: Anomaly detection can be considered as firstly the 
learning of normal behaviours of systems or networks and the subsequent detection of 
anomalies that violate those normal behaviours. Such systems are capable of identifying 
a wide range of malicious events, such as an application consuming all available CPU 
cycles of a host, all available bandwidth on a network, or a sudden increase in the 
number of FTP sessions. 
Unfortunately anomaly detection is not suited to adapting to benign changes in normal 
activities. A change of schedule in lunch breaks can trigger an alert. This problem can 
seriously increase the number of false positives. The repeated updating of system and 
network profiles helps solve the problem, but is expensive and user and network activity 
are changing all the time [118]. Another problem with regularly updating profiles is 
poisoning: by gradually augmenting attack traffic an intruder may be able to effectively 
retrain the system to accept attack and reject normal traffic. 
3.3.4 Host-based IDS vs. Network-based IDS 
Data sensors are another primary element of an IDS. Data sensor location affects 
monitoring scope and the range of protection offered by an IDS. Depending on the 
placement of data sensors, IDSs are classified into host-based IDS and network-based 
IDS. 
Host-based IDS 
A host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS) is installed on a single host and 
monitors its resources for any malicious activity or events [120]. The host can be a 
database server, an administrative workstation or any “important” network computer. 
Most work as a specialized security layer and require modifying the underlying 
operating system‟s kernel. Integrated into the kernel, HIDS data sensors are the first to 
inspect system data minimising the risk of its modification by malware attempting to 
hide its tracks. Data sensors have access to resources usage patterns, system security 
logs, application logs, system memory, registry and file system modifications, and 
network traffic. The analysis engine and management console of a HIDS are commonly 
combined with data sensors and installed on the same host. An example of an open 
source HIDS is OSSEC [121]. Another example is Tripwire [122] which is a security 
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tool operating at the system level. It monitors the integrity of system files and reports 
suspicious file changes to the user. 
Advantages: HIDSs have the ability to obtain high quality data from low level local 
activities because they operate close to the operating system kernel. Such activities 
include file accesses, changes to file permissions and attempts to access privileged 
services. Information can be collected quickly by data sensors. And if an attack is 
detected, a response can be rapidly initiated [123]. HIDSs are well suited to detecting 
attacks from inside the host rather than from the network. The installation of a HIDS is 
simple as there are no additional hardware requirements compared to other types of IDS, 
such as the dedicated servers required for network-based IDS.  
Disadvantages: Since HIDSs are deployed at single hosts and work alone, they normally 
perform the analysis alone, there is no collaboration with other hosts, they are not able 
to detect attacks aimed at a number of hosts. A single installation benefits only a single 
host and there may be much duplication of effort across multiple installations. A HIDS 
often can only detect an attack once a suspicious log entry has been made, and in many 
cases, this means the system has already been compromised. Within a compromised 
system, a HIDS may be susceptible to illegal tampering [124]. 
Network-based IDS 
A network-based intrusion detection system (NIDS) captures and analyzes network 
traffic at selected points on a network to protect the entire network from various threats 
[112]. Traffic is examined packet-by-packet in order to identify malicious or intrusive 
activities or events such as port scans, DoS attacks etc. NIDSs have the whole network 
as their protection scope and are commonly installed on dedicated machines within the 
network [125]. In order to access overall network traffic and detect threats in real-time 
or close to real-time, NIDS data sensors usually are located at the boundaries of network 
segments (Figure 3.3). Network devices such as routers, hubs, switches or even a 
network card in promiscuous mode, can work as data sensors which collect network 
traffic for the NIDS. A typical NIDS analyzes the network traffic locally rather than 
remotely due to the huge amount of network traffic to be processed. Captured traffic is 
analyzed by the analysis engine which inspects headers and packet data. Contrasting 
with HIDSs, NIDSs are designed to protect more than one host within networks while 
HIDSs monitor users and software activities on a single host [64][115]. There are many 
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network-based IDSs, including Snort [117] and Internet Security Systems‟ [126] 
RealSecure Sensor. 
 
Figure 3.3 NIDS Locations 
There are several locations that data sensors can be installed. Firstly, data sensors can be 
placed between the external firewall and the Internet to sniff all packets which target the 
protected network. The second location is just inside the external firewall to catch the 
traffic that manages to get through the firewall. Examining the traffic in this stage may 
also catch problems with the external firewall policy. The third location is the boundary 
of each internal network in order to monitor segments of the network such as separated 
LANs in order to detect insider attacks. 
Advantages: NIDSs protect not only networks but also multiple hosts within networks 
[127]. Because NIDSs examine the overall network traffic, they are able to detect 
intrusions occurring at different hosts. NIDSs do not need to install software on every 
host in the network to collect data, so most NIDSs are operating system independent. 
NIDSs continuously inspect network traffic, record and report suspicious events to 
administrators for appropriate response. NIDSs are able to detect and respond to attacks 
before they have been successfully completed because they can be intercepted before 
reaching their target.  
Disadvantages: When NIDSs work with heavy network traffic, they may drop packets 
due to performance problems. NIDSs are not able to inspect encrypted traffic [128]. 
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Although the content of encrypted packets cannot be inspected, traffic analysis may still 
reveal useful information such as the volume of traffic, the source and destination ports, 
the source and destination IP addresses and protocols used. 
3.3.5 Hybrid IDS 
Both primary types of IDS have been presented in previous sections, their strengths and 
weaknesses have been explained. Combining both approaches into a hybrid system is an 
obvious idea. Many hybrid IDSs have appeared in the intrusion detection area, such as 
the distributed IDS [129], the autonomous agents IDS [130, 131], the mobile agent-
based distributed IDS [114] and multi-sensor IDS [132].  
Generally a hybrid IDS will have many host agents installed on a selection of hosts or 
on every host in the network. Each agent acts as a data sensor to collect and transfer 
audit data from its host to a central console. The audit data includes local system 
activities and/or network traffic and the central console will further analyze the 
information sent from host agents and generate alerts. The central console also provides 
the user interface to end users and is able to configure and control the entire system and 
every host agent. With a decentralized architecture, host agents coordinate their 
activities and exchange information with each other. 
Advantages and Disadvantages: The hybrid IDS distributes the heavy network traffic 
processing load to agents on network hosts. Distributed intrusions can be easily detected 
by a hybrid IDS. However hybrid IDSs also have weaknesses [133]. A host agent on a 
single host may need to inspect both system activities and its own network traffic and 
send it to a central console or other host agents. Processing such heterogeneous data 
could seriously reduce the performance of both the IDS and the operating systems that 
have agents installed. The information sent to the central console or other host agents 
could increase the overall network traffic, slow network speed and consume network 
bandwidth. With a centralized hybrid IDS architecture, the central console can fail in 
attempting to deal with the mass of data sent from all host agents. 
Given that the IDS that will be proposed in Chapter 4 is closest in design to that of an 
agent-based hybrid IDS, the general architecture of such systems is described below. 
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Autonomous Agents For Intrusion Detection (AAFID) 
The idea of using autonomous agents for intrusion detection (AAFID) was first 
mentioned by Crosbie and Spafford in 1994 [134]. The AAFID architecture has since 
been explored in numerous studies [114][130][131]. It combines features of both host-
based and network-based IDS, and both signature and anomaly detection can be used. In 
the approach, data collection and analysis is implemented by a set of distributed low-
level agents. An agent is defined in [135] as: “…a software entity which functions 
continuously and autonomously in a particular environment…able to carry out activities 
in a flexible and intelligent manner that is responsive to changes in the environment…”. 
Figure 3.4 shows the AAFID architecture. It has four primary components: user 
interface, monitors, transceivers and agents. Agents are a fundamental element in 
AFFID and are used to gather raw data while transceivers and monitors co-ordinate data 
collection and analysis.  
 
Figure 3.4 AAFID Architecture (adapted from [130]) 
Agents: One or more agents are installed on the monitored host and run independently, 
there is no communication between agent. Different agents are responsible for 
monitoring different host behaviours. One may inspect network events such as telnet 
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connections for example while another watches for registry changes. Once suspicious 
events are detected, agents submit reports to their transceiver (a transceiver must be 
installed on each host running an agent).  
Transceivers: Transceivers control agents and receive data from them. A transceiver 
may carry out some processing on the data received (e.g. removing duplicate data, 
performing compression) before passing the data on to a monitor. Transceivers in turn 
are controlled by monitors. 
Monitors: The highest-level components in the AAFID architecture are monitors. They 
manage transceivers and process data submitted by them in order to detect intrusions. A 
monitor can evaluate overall network health as it receives reports from a distributed set 
of transceivers and can detect attacks that a single transceiver might miss. For 
redundancy a transceiver may report to more than one monitor. Monitors may be 
managed by other monitors. The agent-transceiver-monitor hierarchy is illustrated in 
Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5 Components’ hierarchy in AAFID (adapted from [130]) 
User Interface: The highest-level monitor has a user interface. Through this interface, 
users can request information from and control IDS components as well as check 
overall network health. 
The AAFID approach has some of the advantages of both host-based and network-
based IDSs. However data analysis is complicated by the fact that it comes from 
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different sources. In order to detect attacks, a large number of agents may be needed on 
each host and they may consume significant system resources. 
3.3.6 IDS Today 
In this section, a brief overview of a selection of popular open source and proprietary 
IDSs is presented. 
Open Source 
Snort: [13, 117] Snort is an open source network intrusion prevention and detection 
system originally developed by Marty Roesh in 1998. It is perhaps the most popular 
open source IDS in use today and is supported by an open source community who 
provide add-ons and detection signatures. A signature detection technique is used by 
Snort. It has its own rule-driven language to implement rules that detect intrusive 
activity. This language combines signatures, network protocols and anomalous network 
activities. Snort can be used as a network or host-based IDS (by being installed on a 
single host and inspecting its local network traffic). Snort was originally developed for 
UNIX, but it has been successfully ported to the MS Windows operating system and has 
its own management console. How Snort is deployed in practice will be considered in 
Chapter 4.  
OSSEC (Open Source Security): OSSEC [121] is a free, open source host-based IDS. 
Its analysis engine can check file integrity, monitor the Windows registry, detect 
rootkits and perform log analysis. It includes two important components: a manager and 
agent. The central manager receives data from agents. Agents of OSSEC run on 
multiple platforms such as Linux, MacOS and Windows. 
Prelude: Prelude [136] open source IDS was created in 1998 by Yoann Vandorrselaere. 
The Prelude IDS is a hybrid IDS that inspects both host system activities and network 
traffic. It standardises detected security events into an international standard format 
called the "Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format" (IDMEF) [137]. There are 
four important parts in the Prelude IDS: sensors, management server, database, and web 
GUI. 
Proprietary 
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Internet Security Systems (ISS): The Internet Security Systems [126] are a selection of 
network-based information security products developed by IBM. IBM ISS products 
include Proventia Network Intrusion Prevention System and RealSecure Server Sensor. 
Cisco IDS: Cisco IDS [138] is a network-based system that combines several Cisco 
hardware and software products. It helps large and small corporations protect their 
sensitive data and internal network. 
3.3.7 Summary 
Intrusion detection systems aim to proactively monitor and protect hosts and networks 
from malicious activity. Whether a NIDS is implemented across the entire network or a 
HIDS is installed on a specific host, the IDS will attempt to identify suspicious or 
malicious events which may have bypassed the firewall or originate from internal 
networks. A correctly configured IDS can also take pre-defined actions to respond to the 
ongoing threats. 
Intrusion detection applications can improve overall security, but have weaknesses. 
False positives are a serious problem for IDS. Non-malicious, innocent network 
anomalies arise and cause false alarms. If false alarms are fired with high enough 
frequency, real attacks can be missed and ignored. A high false positive rate also has 
negative effects beyond the obscuring of real attacks. Manually investigating false 
positives imposes a time-consuming administrative burden on the user. This problem 
can be reduced by fine-tuning IDSs after initial installation and keeping threat 
signatures up to date. However maintaining IDSs can require much effort and expertise, 
such as continued configuration, alert follow-up and rule and signature updates. NIDSs 
sometimes drop packets and miss events when they are handling large amounts of 
traffic. In general IDSs are complex pieces of software with numerous dependencies. 
This complexity can make them difficult to install, configure and use. Even though 
there are weaknesses in IDSs, they have a role to play in network security to protect 
hosts and networks and the problems of installation, configuration and feedback 
interpretation need solving. In the next chapter a system is proposed to reduce these 
problems.  
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3.4 Summary 
Different approaches to defending against threats to computers and networks were the 
subject of this chapter, specifically, firewalls, antivirus software and intrusion detection 
systems. In particular, we centered our attentions on intrusion detection techniques. A 
brief history of intrusion detection was presented, highlighting the development of 
several types of intrusion detection techniques and systems. Different techniques 
including signature and anomaly detectors were described and compared. Different 
types of IDS including network-based, host-based and hybrid IDS were presented. 
Advantages and disadvantages of each type of system were compared. 
In Chapter 4, and in response to the IDS issues identified above, a hybrid web-based 
intrusion detection application will be proposed. Details of the proposed application will 
be presented including its requirements, component technologies, design and 
implementation. 
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4 Intrusion Detection and Management over the WWW 
In Chapters 1 and 2 it was established both that Internet user profiles have changed and 
that Internet threat levels are rising. In Chapter 3 the available network defences for 
Internet users were explored with a particular emphasis on IDS. Clearly, for users 
operating in an increasingly hostile Internet environment IDS could have an important 
role to play in their protection and in raising their threat awareness levels. However IDS 
has yet to be widely adopted by today‟s typical user. In this chapter we explore why this 
has been the case and in response draw up requirements for a new IDS aimed at today‟s 
user. The main part of this chapter describes the design and implementation of the latter 
IDS. 
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.1 requirements for the proposed IDS 
are presented using the popular IDS, Snort, as a case study to highlight why IDS have 
not been widely adopted by typical users. With the requirements defined we specify in 
Section 4.2 the design and implementation of an IDS aimed at addressing those 
requirements. The section begins with an overview of the system followed by a more 
detailed description of its components. In Section 4.3 two use cases are provided to 
illustrate how the proposed system would be used in practice and the associated security 
benefits. The chapter concludes with a summary in Section 4.4. 
4.1 Meeting the Typical User’s IDS Needs 
The popular IDS Snort, described in previous chapters, can be configured as a host-
based IDS to protect a single host or deployed as a network-based IDS to monitor an 
entire network. Below, in order to introduce the requirements of the system proposed in 
this chapter we consider the problems arising when Snort is used in either of these 
scenarios. 
Example: Snort as a host-based IDS 
The Snort IDS can be installed on a single host to protect it against network threats. 
However the installation, configuration and maintenance of a Snort system are not 
straightforward. In particular the following tasks need to be carried out: 
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1. The PCAP packet capture library must be installed (libpcap [113] for UNIX and 
winpcap [139] for Windows) before Snort can be deployed. 
2. A database server such as MySQL, Microsoft SQL Server or Oracle must be 
installed as required by Snort. 
3. The database must be configured for use with Snort: the Snort user must be 
created, privileges assigned and tables created. This database will contain 
detected attacks. 
4. Snort itself can now be downloaded and installed. 
5. Snort must be appropriately configured through modifying the snort.conf file. 
Examples include configuring network settings, rule settings and output settings. 
The network settings are used to define the network interface that Snort is 
working on. Using rule settings the user can enable or disable rules which are 
used to detect the threats. The output settings allow Snort‟s information to be 
presented to users in different ways such as in a text file or in a database [77]. 
6. Installing a graphical user interface to the Snort output requires the downloading 
and installation of a web server such as Apache [117] or IIS [140], PHP [117], 
and the Analysis Console for Intrusion Detection (ACID) [117]. 
7. For effective protection it is necessary to regularly update‟s Snort rules and 
signature database. 
Carrying out the above steps in addition to filtering and interpreting Snort‟s output are 
tasks outside the abilities of today‟s typical Internet user. Furthermore such a simple 
installation while allowing the detection of inbound attacks does not allow users to 
observe how their machine is behaving on the network and how it is viewed by other 
machines sharing the network. Such a view would help reveal the infection of a host 
with malware that initiated network traffic instead of the owner. 
Example: Snort as a network-based IDS 
The Snort IDS can also be used as a network IDS to protect a network. By connecting 
Snort to a router or a switch an entire network or subnet can be monitored. If an 
experienced network administrator implements the Snort installation, configuration and 
maintenance, the user is relieved of the technical challenges and is effectively protected. 
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However, under such a configuration Snort can only protect computers within the 
network. Given the mobility of modern users many machines will lose this defence 
when users work or browse the Internet from home or go on a business trip. Worse yet, 
users‟ machines while not being protected may be infected by malware before 
subsequently rejoining a network where only the perimeter is monitored. Also, deployed 
as a network IDS, Snort provides no straightforward feedback to computer network 
users. The fact that a machine may have been scanned and subsequently further 
investigated by an attacker as a potential target is not communicated its owner. 
Requirements 
In light of the above shortcomings we give below a list of requirements for the IDS to 
be described in subsequent sections. The new IDS should: 
 Demonstrate to users that they are targets in order to raise their security 
awareness (raising threat awareness has been identified by the OECD as a key 
factor in fighting malware [28]) 
 Be web accessible so mobile users (business and recreational) are free to roam 
networks and receive constant feedback 
 Export a web interface to ensure users receive feedback through a medium the 
majority of them are comfortable with: their browser 
 Provide feedback to users on the behaviour of their machine (as seen by others 
on the network) in order to detect possible malware infection 
 Be remotely administered and configured to relieve the user of technical 
complexity 
 Offload intrusion analysis to make it suitable for deployment on devices of 
limited processing power 
 Only increase processing in the face of a possible attack in order to limit 
network traffic 
 Employ open source tools to avoid duplication of effort 
 Be simple to install compared with other IDSs 
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The design and implementation of a prototype system aimed at meeting these 
requirements is described below. 
4.2 Design and Implementation of a Hybrid WWW Intrusion 
Detection System 
An overview of the system is provided in the section below. This is followed by a more 
detailed description of its design and implementation. 
4.2.1 System Overview 
Figure 4.1 gives an overview of the system. The approach draws on features of both 
host-based and network-based IDS with distributed agents reporting to a central server. 
The system works as follows: 
 
Figure 4.1 System overview (A laptop catches a suspicious event X from a PDA 
and reports it to the server) 
 Agents are downloaded from the server and installed across a number of client 
machines. Those machines may be on a shared network or different networks 
(see Figure 4.1). In the prototype system described here, the security of the agent 
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is assumed. Any real implementation would, however, have to deal with various 
issues including client-side tampering of configuration files, secure 
authentication of the server, secure communication with the server, denial-of-
service attacks and coding vulnerabilities (e.g. buffer overflow). Addressing 
these issues is covered under future work in the final chapter of the thesis. 
 Each agent monitors its inbound network traffic and reports traffic deemed 
worthy of analysis to the central server. Only inbound traffic is ever passed to 
the server for analysis. Such an approach aims to reduce the performance cost of 
running an agent (suitability of the agent for resource-limited devices is a 
requirement). It is also assumed that a client infected with malware will attempt 
to infect other clients whose agents will submit that traffic to the server. Only 
considering inbound traffic thus avoids duplicate submissions to the server. (The 
process behind deciding whether traffic is worthy of analysis is covered in a 
later section.)  
 Data for analysis is submitted over the WWW to the central server. 
 Analysis is carried out at a central server with the aid of a local Snort installation.  
 All security events are managed at the server.  
 All client configuration is managed at the server. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Proposed IDS over the Network 
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 Users (owners of client machines) can log into the server over the WWW to 
receive feedback on their machine. Feedback shows whether their machine has 
been targeted and whether their machine has been reported by other agents.  
 Agents submit only minimal information until faced with a perceived threat 
when the amount of information submitted increases such that a more detailed 
analysis can be carried out by the server. 
 All agents are remotely administered at the server. Network administrators use a 
web interface to monitor network health, supervise agents and take security-
related action if appropriate. The central server also utilises the Snort IDS to 
provide an informed diagnosis to administrators where possible.  
4.2.2 Gathering Data: Agent Design and Implementation 
In this section, the design and implementation of the agent is presented in detail. 
4.2.2.1 Design 
The agent
1
 is designed to minimise memory and CPU usage to make it suitable for 
running on a variety of devices from PDAs to laptops, which can take part in network 
communications. It offers no GUI itself but rather users connect to a web application to 
receive appropriate feedback. Below we describe the agent‟s main features. 
Reporting 
The main function of the agent application is to monitor its host‟s network traffic and 
report potentially security-relevant traffic to the server. The decision process involved in 
determining whether traffic is to be reported is depicted in Figure 4.3. Only inbound 
TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic is considered for reporting. These protocols account for 
more than 95% of Internet traffic [141]. In order to understand how the agent works we 
step though the decision tree below.  
 
 
1. The IDS described here was developed in collaboration with a colleague [27]. Although the author did not implement the agent, 
he was involved in its design. It is described here for completeness. The author designed and implemented the server and all server-
side processing. 
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1. When a packet arrives it is first compared to client rules that implement a 
whitelist e.g. an agent may be installed on a machine that runs a web server in 
which case traffic to port 80 from some set of IP addresses may be whitelisted. 
Any traffic that matches a whitelist entry is ignored by the agent. 
 
Figure 4.3 Packets Decision Tree 
2. Next the packet is compared to a list of established connections and a list of 
expected responses for connectionless protocols and if not part of one of those 
connections it is deemed “unsolicited traffic” and is passed to the server for 
analysis. It is marked as an event for the server to indicate that it is security-
relevant (all events are displayed and browsable at the server). To implement 
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this logic the client must implement stateful packet inspection. Thus the 
establishment of incoming and outgoing connections must be tracked so that 
subsequent traffic can be related to those connections. Note traffic that is part of 
an established connection may be passed to the server if the sender is on a 
watchlist (see below).  
3. At this stage we know the packet is part of an existing connection or a response 
request. However, a machine may have been behaving suspiciously in the past 
and have been placed on a watchlist. The next question asks if the machine from 
which the packet was received is currently on the watchlist and thus being 
monitored. If so the packet is forwarded for analysis whether it belongs to an 
established connection or not. Note: it is not marked as an event but rather as a 
potential event. It becomes an event if at the server it is deemed after analysis to 
be security-relevant. This approach helps minimise the amount of data presented 
at the server. 
4. If the packet is part of an established connection and not from a machine on the 
watchlist it is ignored. 
Thus, and in summary, an agent reports two things: events and potential events. It 
should be stressed that potential events become events only if analysis at the server 
reveals them to be security relevant. This avoids complicating the server interface with 
too much data. 
Client Rules (whitelisting)  
Client rules implement a whitelist and are remotely configured at the server and drawn 
down by the agent. By default all agents are furnished with a blank whitelist. At the 
server side the whitelist can be further configured to filter out irrelevant data. 
Blacklisting in the face of an attack is currently not implemented and is presented as a 
possible extension under future work in the concluding chapter. 
Connection List 
In order that only unsolicited or unexpected traffic be reported as an event to the server 
the client must track the establishment of all existing connections (TCP) and outbound 
information requests (ICMP, UDP). Should incoming traffic be part of an existing 
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connection or be in response to a request it is processed differently. After a timeout any 
non-active connections are removed from the connection list. 
Watchlist 
The watchlist is a group of IP addresses managed by the server and drawn down by 
each agent. Machines on the watchlist are those that have passed some suspicion 
threshold in order to be placed there. For example, a machine having been reported ten 
times in a one minute period might be worthy of detailed monitoring. At the server such 
a machine would be placed on the watchlist and the updated watchlist delivered to 
relevant clients. Once on a watchlist all inbound traffic to any agent from that IP address 
is forwarded to the server for analysis. More details on watchlist management are 
presented in a subsequent section. An IP-based watchlist has its limitations and these 
are dealt with under future work in the concluding chapter.  
Communication 
In addition to network traffic various other information between agent and server are 
exchanged as follows:  
Heartbeat 
In order for the server to keep track of which clients are online and actively 
participating, a heartbeat message is periodically sent from each agent to the server. 
This heartbeat consists of a unique agent identifier. At the server side a list of currently 
active agents and corresponding client information is always on display. 
Updates 
The agent is constantly listening for updates from the server. These may be updates to 
its client rules, watchlist or configuration (e.g. heartbeat period). When a client is first 
installed it has an empty ruleset. Upon the first heartbeat being received from this client 
the server will update it with a ruleset, watchlist and configuration. As stated earlier, 
secure authentication of the server by the client is, in this prototype system, simply 
assumed. A secure implementation would require the client authenticate the server using, 
for example, public key certificates before accepting any updates from it. 
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4.2.2.2 Implementation 
In this section we provide some relevant details related to the implementation of the 
agent described above. 
Implementation language and target operating system  
The agent is an MS Windows application and is written in C#. C# was chosen as it has 
WinPCAP library bindings to simplify traffic analysis (see below) and being a managed 
language is more secure than C. The MS Windows operating system was chosen as it is 
the most popular desktop operating system in the world [142]. 
Identifying agents 
Due to the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), there may be no fixed IP 
address associated with a client and IP addresses thus cannot be used to track client 
machines and agents. As a result a unique identifying code is required for each agent. It 
is assigned by the central server when the agent is installed. The identifying code 
appears in every communication between each agent and the server in order that a 
server can relate submitted data to agents.  
Catching events: WinPCAP Library 
The agent must be capable of catching network traffic before it reaches applications in 
order to decide whether to report it to the server according to the client ruleset. The 
WinPCAP packet capture library [139] is ideal for this purpose. WinPCAP is an open 
source port of the Unix PCAP library [113] to the MS Windows operating system. 
Using the library, hooks can be inserted in the network stack such that packets received 
on the monitored network adapter are copied to a user space buffer where the PCAP 
application can inspect them. Filters can be created to enable the copying only of 
packets of interest while ignoring others. In the agent described here filters are applied 
such that only ICMP, UDP and TCP packets are caught. The agent catches both 
inbound and outbound traffic. Although outbound traffic is never forwarded to the 
server it must be caught in order that connections with and requests to other machines 
can be tracked and stateful packet filtering implemented.  
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Communicating events: Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) 
In the proposed system, in order to ensure interoperability and facilitate integration with 
other IDS and security applications, and to adhere to Internet and network standards, 
two network protocols are used for the exchange of events. These protocols, published 
by the Network Working Group, are the Intrusion Detection Exchange Protocol (IDXP) 
[143] and the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) [137]. They are 
a set of specifications that allow the transfer of intrusion detection information between 
the detection device (the agent) and a management station (the server). IDMEF defines 
the data format and structure of messages and IDXP provides exchange procedures for 
transferring messages in IDMEF. Both protocols employ XML (eXtensible Markup 
Language) to standardise the format of data (see Figure 4.4).  
 
Figure 4.4 An Example of an Event in IDMEF 
All other data exchanges in the proposed system, specifically those not defined by these 
protocols (heartbeat, client rules, and client configuration), are also formatted and 
transmitted using XML. The flexibility of XML boosts interoperability and allows for 
simple integration with databases on the server (see Figure 4.5).  
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Figure 4.5 Heartbeat XML Message 
Avoiding firewalls: WWW and HTTP 
A requirement is that the system works with mobile users who are free to roam 
networks and the Internet and receive constant feedback. Although users are mobile 
they are typically connected to the WWW and Internet and it makes sense that 
communication between agents and server occur over the WWW. Thus a user behind a 
firewall that only allows web traffic in and out will still be able to communicate with 
the server and no new ports in the firewall need be opened. Thus the server is 
implemented as a web application and deployed on a web server and agents 
communicate with it over Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [144]. 
The HTTP protocol is a request/response application-level protocol between a client and 
server. Typically a HTTP client such as a web browser initiates a request to a web 
server where a deployed web application is listening on port 80 for the request message 
from the HTTP client. Both request and response message bodies contain the required 
content such as a text message or, as is the case, here an XML formatted message. 
When the agent needs to communicate with the server, it initiates a HTTP request and 
waits for the response.  
The agent must also be ready to accept messages from the server in the form of updates. 
A HTTP listener is set up in the agent to listen for the HTTP requests from the web 
server. When the web server needs to communicate to agents, it initiates a request to an 
agent‟s listener and waits for the response. The required information is exchanged 
within the request/response message. (Note this approach  causes  problems  when ports 
are blocked by a client firewall and when DHCP means client IP addresses may change 
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on the fly. Resolving these issues through having the agent poll the server for updates is 
covered in the final chapter of the thesis under future work.) 
Because the exchanged information may contain sensitive data, the exchange ought to 
occur over HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure) [145]. HTTPS is a 
combination of the HTTP protocol and a cryptographic protocol, it encrypts HTTP 
messages prior to transmission and decrypts messages upon arrival. The incorporation 
of HTTPS is considered again under future work. Most web servers including IIS 
support HTTPS. 
4.2.3 Managing Clients and Events: Server Design and Implementation 
In this section, the design and implementation of the server is presented. An overview 
of the server is depicted in figure 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.6 System Architecture 
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4.2.3.1 Design 
An overview of the server is presented in Figure 4.6. The server combines several 
components including a web server, a database server, and a server-side Snort IDS 
installation. One important role of the server is to analyse data submitted by agents and 
present it to both administrators and end users. One interface, the agent communication 
interface, receives data from distributed agents and uses Snort to analyse that data 
before inserting it in a database. A second web user interface allows administrators and 
users to view events. This second interface also allows administrators to manage clients, 
configure the overall system and respond to events. 
Server Functions 
The server is designed around the functions it is required to support and an overview of 
the server‟s main functions is presented in Figure 4.7. In the following sections each of 
these major functions is described. Where applicable each function will be related to the 
requirement it is designed to meet.  
 
 
Figure 4.7 Server Functions 
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 Event analysis and response 
Analysis: 
Data submitted from clients is inserted in a database and analysed by Snort. Data which 
is not marked as an event and does not match a Snort rule or server rule is discarded. 
Events remain in the database and are displayed for viewing. Submitted events are 
cross-referenced with currently online agents and if an online agent is the subject of a 
report that fact is noted and the event report is associated with that agent. In this way, 
users running an agent can view how their machine is behaving irrespective of its 
changing IP address. A GEOIP database [146] is consulted and each IP address is 
associated with a location where possible. When an event is displayed along with it is 
the corresponding date and time, source IP, source name (and geographic location), 
destination IP, destination name, network protocol and Snort or server rule mark up. If 
the event matches no Snort rule or server rule then a default message “Unsolicited 
Traffic” is displayed. 
Main page administrator view:  
Given the latest events are of interest to administrators and users alike, the server main 
page makes that information immediately available. The main page is the web page 
presented immediately after the logging in to the server. A screenshot is presented in 
Figure 4.8. This page is the primary page of the web UI and displays various 
information including the function navigation menu, system state summary information, 
the active client table and the latest events table. For administrators all events 
irrespective of origin or destination are displayed. 
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Figure 4.8 Main Page – Administrator View 
Different server functions can be accessed from the function navigation menu. The 
system state summary information shows the user name associated with the currently 
logged in user, their user level, the number of users that are currently using the system, 
a count of today‟s events, the number of total events in the database and the number of 
active clients. 
 
Figure 4.9 Main Page – User View 
Main page user view: 
Users (owners of client machines) can also log into the system to view events reported 
by their machine and reports of their machine. In this way they use a web interface to 
check how their machine is behaving on the network and check whether it has been 
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subjected to any attacks. An example screenshot of this perspective is given in Figure 
4.9. 
Examine Events:  
The server provides a web page for administrative users to examine in detail events 
received from clients. An example is provided in Figure 4.10. From each event a new 
client rule or server rule may be generated. A client rule might be to whitelist traffic in 
order that it is not reported again. Such rules can be pushed out to a single client or to 
all clients. A server rule might allow further action to be taken by the server on receipt 
of future reports that match this one. For example, a server rule might say that when an 
event has a particularly high Snort severity level associated with it that all clients should 
cease communication with that client effectively isolating it. We return to this issue 
under future work.  
 
Figure 4.10 Examine Events 
When an event is selected as the basis for the creation of a rule all rule fields are filled 
in based on the contents of the event (Figure 4.11). The administrator can then make the 
rule less specific by disabling certain fields. When events are displayed they are marked 
as matching particular server rules with an alert message displayed in addition to any 
other message provided by Snort. 
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Figure 4.11 A Server Rule Based on Nmap Xmas scan 
An example server rule is shown in Figure 4.11. This rule will be fired when a TCP 
packet header has the URG, PSH and FIN flags set indicating the reporting client has 
been the victim of an Xmas scan. (This particular scan would also be detected by Snort 
and is presented only as an example of a server rule. Server rules do not match against 
packet contents, only headers, and their application in the current system is limited.) An 
alert message might recommend for example that the client contact their network 
administrator as soon as possible. When a user logs in this message will be made 
available to them. 
 Watchlist Management 
The server supports a watchlist function that is designed to limit the amount of data 
passed to it for analysis. Only IP addresses that have passed some administrator defined 
“suspicion threshold” are placed on the watchlist. The suspicion threshold is measured 
in terms of events. Once a particular IP address has exceeded the threshold all client 
watchlists are updated and thereafter all inbound traffic between that IP and any agent is 
passed to the server. Not all data submitted to the server for analysis is displayed. Only 
the data marked as events and the data that is designated an event by Snort. Immediately 
the watchlist is updated it is distributed to all clients. 
The watchlist-related parameters can be updated through the update watchlist 
configuration function (Figure 4.12). The watchlist threshold refers to the number of 
events attributed to a specific IP address that must be exceeded in order for it to be 
moved onto the watchlist. The threshold window is the period of time within which the 
threshold must be exceeded. This is necessary so that all machines do not ultimately end 
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up on the watchlist. Once on the watchlist a machine remains there until a defined 
period elapses during which it goes unreported. This is necessary to ensure that a 
machine does not remain on the watchlist indefinitely. 
 
Figure 4.12 Watchlist Configurations 
For example the settings in Figure 4.12 correspond to a threshold of 60 suspicious 
events initiated by the same IP address over a period of 24 hours. If the server has not 
received any events initiated by this IP over the last 48 hours, this IP will be removed 
from the watchlist. 
The watchlist can also be managed manually. Here administrators can view watchlist 
entries and add and remove IP addresses to/from it (Figure 4.13). 
 
Figure 4.13 Watchlist 
The limitations of a watchlist based solely on IP addresses are understood. For example, 
an infected machine, by simply acquiring a new IP address from a DHCP server, may 
escape a watchlist. Also an innocent machine may acquire an IP address previously 
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associated with a misbehaving machine. Its traffic will be passed for further analysis to 
the server even though the machine is clean of malware.  
 Client Management 
Every client downloaded has an identifying code associated with it and the server 
allows the management of that client. Client management functions include add client, 
remove client, edit client configuration, and edit client ruleset. 
Adding a client: 
When a client is downloaded it is assumed that it has an identifying code inside that will 
be submitted with all communications with the server. To enable that client an 
administrator must add it to the system. This is done though the add client function. 
Here details of the client are filled in by the administrator. When a client is added it has 
a rule set and configuration must be assigned to it (see Figure 4.14). A similar window 
is displayed under the edit client function except with previously assigned settings 
already applied. 
 
Figure 4.14 Add Client 
Configuring a client:  
Client configuration management is used to manage the configuration of client agents. 
The configuration currently only includes configuration name and heartbeat period 
(Figure 4.15). However, in the future different configurations can be created depending 
on different client uses. A group of clients which have the same use can be set to use the 
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same client configuration. Once a client configuration is created it is available for 
assigning to clients under the add and edit client functions. 
 
Figure 4.15 Create Client Configuration  
Configuring a client ruleset:  
Client ruleset management includes a set of functions to create and edit client rulesets 
(Figure 4.16). The client ruleset is a set of rules located on the agent, which are used to 
filter the traffic and reduce the communication between agents and the server. Rules act 
as a whitelist effectively defining what traffic is allowed and will never be reported to 
the server. 
A client rule consists of an IP address, MAC address, port number and protocol and 
action (Figure 4.16). The MAC address and IP address specify the connecting host. The 
port number and protocol related to the service running on the client. By default the 
action is set to allow. (Deny is not implemented but we return to this issue under future 
work.) A ruleset can be customised for a single client or created for a group of clients 
and used by them all. For example a group of laboratory machines would presumably 
share the same rules while a member of staff‟s laptop would have its own specific 
configuration. 
Editing a ruleset allows the addition and deletion of rules to/from the ruleset. As stated 
earlier an event report can be used as the basis for creating a new rule. If a rule is added 
to a ruleset, all clients currently using that ruleset will be updated with the new rule. A 
ruleset example “Lab machine” is given in Figure 4.14. 
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Figure 4.16 Create Client Ruleset 
Queue clients‟ settings:  
After modifications to client settings have been made, the agent communication 
interface will check whether these clients are reachable or not, if they are then updates 
are sent, if they are not then the update details are queued. Once the server receives the 
next heartbeat from those clients, the corresponding update will be sent. 
 Account Management 
Account management is a set of functions designed to manage different user accounts 
on the system. In order to use the system an account is required. There are three types of 
account: administrators, analysts and client users. 
Client users with accounts supply a username and password to the login page and are 
presented with a view of all events received and generated by their machine. Their view 
is a passive one in that they cannot alter any settings and are the least privileged users. 
Analysts have the same rights as client users. In addition they can view all events 
generated by each agent. Analysts can also add and configure clients and create server 
rules. 
Administrators have the same rights as analysts. In addition they can create new 
accounts, as well as modify (e.g. reset password) or remove existing ones. They can 
also modify system settings. In short administrators have access to all system functions.  
 Supplementary Functions 
Supplementary functions allow report generation and audit trail review. 
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Report Generation:  
Users can use this function to review summary statistics for the system as a whole. The 
following can be viewed (Figure 4.17): 
 Most attacking IP address 
 Most attacked IP address 
 Most attacked port 
 Most attacked client 
 Most attacking client 
Note that not all machines on the network will run an agent and so we distinguish 
between IP addresses and clients. 
 
Figure 4.17 Statistics 
Audit trail review:  
All actions carried out on the server are logged. Errors are also logged. Logged actions 
include logging in, logging out, adding, modifying, deleting, disabling and enabling 
every element of the system. Along with the action the ID of the user who carried out 
the action is also logged along with when it occurred and if it succeeded or failed and 
the error message if it failed. If problems arise, these logs may help in tracing their 
source. 
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4.2.3.2 Implementation 
In this section we provide some of the more relevant details related to the 
implementation of the server described above. 
Implementation language and target operating system 
The server is a web application running on Microsoft‟s IIS server. It is implemented in 
ASP.NET and C#. Its interfaces use CSS and AJAX. 
Implementing the logic: ASP.NET, C# and IIS 
Active Server Pages (ASP) from Microsoft is a popular web development technology 
supported by Microsoft‟s ASP.NET framework. ASP is a free technology that is used to 
create dynamic web applications from small personal websites through to large 
enterprise-class sites. ASP supports several languages for developing extended 
application logic including C#, Visual Basic and C++. Here C# was used to implement 
the server-side logic. Microsoft also provides a web server for the ASP.NET framework, 
Internet Information Services (IIS). 
In addition, ASP.NET also supports AJAX technology. After the term AJAX was 
coined in early 2005 [147], Microsoft announced “ASP.NET 2.0 AJAX”. The latter is 
an AJAX-oriented .NET library that runs on .NET 2.0. ASP.NET AJAX can be used not 
only to perform ASP operations, but also supports many AJAX features at the client 
side.  
Implementing the database: SQL Server 
The database server is SQL SERVER 2005 from Microsoft and is located on the same 
machine as the web server. There are two databases on this server, one is the database of 
the proposed system, and another is the database required for Snort. The design of the 
database of the proposed system is shown in Figure 4.18.  
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Figure 4.18 Database Tables of the System 
Implementing the analysis: Snort 
Snort is used by the server to help analyse the data submitted by agents. The server will 
employ Snort to check the original packets then import Snort feedback. Snort feedback 
is incorporated into the information made available to users in the server main window. 
Implementing the interface: Web 2.0, AJAX and CSS 
As the interface between end users and the system, the central management console 
plays an important role in the proposed IDS approach. It is required to display system 
information, latest events and active clients in real-time so that the state of the network 
is known and suspicious events are tracked. Client users use the console to check the 
behaviour of their hosts on the network. The information on display is constantly 
changing and so a dynamic web application rather than one based on static web content 
is required for the management console. Web 2.0, the second generation of web 
development technology provides the means to handle this content and bring the 
console closer to the interactive web applications users now expect. 
With the advent of Web 2.0 technologies, web applications have evolved from static 
pages to dynamic, interactive web-based applications. The distinction between desktop 
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and Web applications is increasingly blurred. Dynamic Web 2.0 applications have been 
used in many popular websites such as Gmail, Facebook and Apple.  
 
Figure 4.19 Web 2.0 [148] 
Web 2.0 refers to web-oriented applications and services that use the Internet as a 
platform [149]. It is a collection of technologies (see Figure 4.19). One of its main aims 
is to provide a rich, responsive web application user interface. The Web 2.0 technology 
used in the system described here to provide an interactive interface is AJAX 
(Asynchronous JavaScript and XML).  
AJAX applications use asynchronous interaction which is different from the traditional 
web application approach. With AJAX, client-side scripting is used to exchange data 
with a web server. Web applications can retrieve data from the server asynchronously, 
in the background, without interfering with the display and behaviour of the existing 
page. AJAX enables web pages to be updated dynamically without causing a full page 
refresh to occur. Web pages are more responsive exchanging small amounts of data with 
the server so that the entire web page does not have to be reloaded each time changes 
are requested.  
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The AJAX application‟s working principle is different to the classic web application 
(see Figure 4.20). Normally in a web application, users‟ actions such as clicking buttons 
on a form invoke HTTP requests sent back to the web server. The server processes the 
request, performs some calculations and database operations, and then returns back to 
the client a whole new page. The server and browser go through the process even if 
there is no change or only a small change. This behaviour sometimes causes an 
undesirable user experience such as losing interaction with the page or waiting a long 
time for a page to be updated. An AJAX-enabled application eliminates the intermittent 
nature of interaction through the introduction of a middle layer placed between the 
client and server. This middle layer is commonly called the AJAX engine and is 
composed of JavaScript code. The engine talks to the server on behalf of the client. It 
sends the HTTP request to the server and updates the contents of the page. 
 
Figure 4.20 AJAX Application Working Principles (adapted from [147] ) 
AJAX is used in the system described here. On the primary page of the central 
management console, the latest suspicious events sent from agents have to be displayed 
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in real time. The page needs to be updated when new events arrive. It is unnecessary to 
reload the entire page when new events come in each time, and the page only needs to 
be updated if there are new events. AJAX allows the page to communicate with the 
server asynchronously. Only if there are new events is the page updated. The update 
only reloads the currently viewable table. All other parts of the page are not updated and 
if there are no new events, then nothing is updated until the new events occur. 
Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) 
CSS [150] were introduced by the W3C (the World Wide Web Consortium) as a 
mechanism for controlling the appearance of HTML documents. CSS is a style sheet 
language used to describe the presentation of a document written in a markup language 
such as HTML, XHTML or XML. CSS is used to enable the separation of page contents 
on the management console from page presentation, such as colours, fonts and layout.  
 
 
Figure 4.21 Implementation Techniques 
An overview of the technologies used in the system is presented in Figures 4.21, 4.22 
and 4.23. Figure 4.21 shows the technologies employed and where they fit in the 
implementation. Figure 4.22 shows the processing pipeline involved in moving from 
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raw network data observed by an agent to an alert presented in the server interface. 
Lastly, Figure 4.23 gives an overview of the entire system in action. 
 
 
Figure 4.22 Events with Main Components 
 
Figure 4.23 Processing Flow of the System 
4.3 System Use Cases 
With the description of the entire system complete we present below two use cases to 
illustrate the potential applications of the system. The two use cases are from the 
perspectives of two main user groups: network users and network administrators.  
Use Case 1: The Small Business Network 
As reported earlier in this thesis more and more wireless networks are being used by 
businesses. In some instances it can be assumed there is little network security expertise 
to hand. Consider a GP surgery where a number of doctors may provide services to 
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patients. A wireless network may be used to connect various machines together and to 
the Internet. In order to gain some form of protection such a group could sign up to be 
monitored by a security-provider. By simply installing the proposed agents on their 
machines they can receive feedback on the behaviour of each machine as seen by others 
and also whether their machines have been attacked. The security-provider receives 
regular updates from each machine and an expert can assess the security of the network. 
They can also make recommendations for improving network security in the presence of 
detected weaknesses. The surgery has a higher level of assurance that patient details are 
protected given that their security has been handed off to a knowledgeable and trusted 
third party. In addition the doctors themselves conveniently receive feedback on the 
security of their machines and networks through their browser, an interface with which 
they are familiar.  
 
Use Case 2: The Corporate Network 
Consider the case of a company with an internal network and in-house network security 
expertise. An administrator needs to monitor and enforce the security of the network. To 
that end firewalls, antivirus software and a proxy may be deployed. However with 
machines being taken often offsite for business meetings etc. a machine may become 
infected with malware and on rejoining the internal network bypass the deployed 
security measures and go on to infect other machines. Typically, once a machine is 
offsite it is no longer under the protection of the home network administrator and 
attacks against it go unobserved. Its user, being a business person, may be unaware of 
the security risks when operating in hotels, airports or Internet cafés. 
By installing the agent on mobile machines the network administrator is able to track 
machines and gauge the risks to which they are exposed even while offsite. Client 
rulesets can be adjusted depending on their operating environment and feedback can be 
provided to a company‟s employees over the web. Problems on the home network can 
also be detected and network administrators have a new network health metric in the 
number of events reported by agents. Insider-attacks can be observed. Lastly, users 
knowing that events associated with their machines are logged are disinclined to launch 
attacks against co-workers. 
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4.4 Summary 
Details of a hybrid IDS for use over the WWW were presented in this chapter. Starting 
from a list of requirements the design and implementation of a system aimed at meeting 
those requirements was presented. Those requirements are summarised in Table 4.1 
along with a brief indicator of how they are met. 
Requirements Met by 
Demonstrate to users they are targets 
User interface shows attacks against a 
user‟s machine 
Provide feedback to users on the 
behaviour of their machine 
User interface show attacks launched 
by that user‟s machine 
Be remotely administered and configured 
Client management is handled by the 
server administrator 
Offload intrusion analysis  Analysis is carried out at the server 
Only increase traffic in face of attack 
Only machines on watchlist are 
closely monitored 
Be web accessible to mobile users 
The application is implemented as a 
web application: events are submitted 
and feedback provided over the web 
Export a web interface 
An interface implemented with AJAX 
techniques provides feedback to users 
through their browser so no new 
applications need be learned 
Employ open source tools  Snort is used for analysis 
Be simple to install 
Since analysis is done remotely, the 
client is simple to install 
 
Table 4.1 Requirements Met 
 
In the following chapter the system will be tested. First server performance will be 
considered. Then the system‟s ability to detect a range of attacks will be tested. Lastly, 
the results observed having deployed the system on the network of the School of 
Computing in DCU will be reported.  
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5 Results 
A hybrid IDS prototype designed for deployment on the WWW was presented in the 
previous chapter. In this chapter we report the results of testing the proposed system in 
both laboratory and real world settings. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.1 we report on performance testing 
carried out on the system. The performance testing was carried out using Google‟s open 
source Page Speed application [151]. An overview of Page Speed and the results it 
produced will be presented. In Section 5.2 we present system validation results. A 
number of tools and security testing utilities were used to implement attacks against a 
given client in order to verify that the server (and its Snort installation) correctly 
identified and reported them to administrators and end users. In order to test the ability 
of the system to operate effectively “in the wild” we deployed it on the DCU School of 
Computing wireless and laboratory LANs. Results of this testing are reported in Section 
5.3. The chapter concludes with a summary in Section 5.4. 
5.1 Performance Testing 
Users and administrators interact with the IDS over the WWW. To ensure end user 
acceptance it is important that the web application that implements the IDS be as 
responsive as possible. Since event analysis is carried out by Snort, and boosting its 
performance is beyond the scope of this project, here we concentrate on measuring the 
performance of the IDS web user interface as it appears in the end user‟s browser. A 
performance measuring utility produced by Google, Page Speed [151], was used to 
evaluate the server‟s web interface. Its aim is to detect and remove web page download 
problems so they load and display faster thus improving the user‟s experience of the 
application. 
Page Speed comes as a Firefox add-on. It uses Firebug [152] to analyse the performance 
of the web pages delivered by a web application. It looks at a wide range of potentially 
performance-inhibiting issues and offers performing improving suggestions in the areas 
of cache optimisation, minimising round trip times, minimising request size and 
minimising payload size. For example, in the Figure 5.1, the suggestions “leverage 
browser caching” and “leverage proxy caching” are in red, which means they could be 
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improved. Many resources included in web pages are changed infrequently and take 
time to download over the network, such as JavaScript files, image files, CSS files and 
so on. The “optimize caching” suggests that the HTTP traffic received from the server is 
not maximising browser and proxy cache performance. 
Page Speed measures the performance of each downloaded page and gives a 
corresponding score. It also provides suggestions on how the performance of the web 
application might be improved and draws attention to issues that may need particular 
attention.  
Below is an example of Page Speed in action. In Figure 5.1 it is being run against our 
application‟s examine events page. For each page a set of scores against different best 
practices is produced. These rules and suggestions are based on a set of commonly 
accepted best practices that Google and other websites implement. A green tick signifies 
compliance, a red circle means work required and an amber triangle indicates neutral. 
An overall performance summary is also provided (amber triangle in Figure 5.1).  
 
 
(A) Before 
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(B)  After 
Figure 5.1 Performance Evaluation with Page Speed 
Based on the feedback provided by Page Speed several modifications were made to the 
web application. One particular improvement involved implementing the suggestion to 
“Remove unused CSS”. Before a browser can begin to render a web page, all style 
sheets associated with the page must be loaded. The CSS engine on the browser will 
evaluate every rule contained in the file to determine whether the rule applies to 
elements of the current page. Commonly, a single, large CSS file could be reused by 
many web pages in a web application, even if many of the rules defined in it do not 
apply to the current page. The browser has to download all rules including unused rules 
and parse them. As a result it is possible that delivered with pages is a large amount of 
CSS that is not required. The result is a delay in web page display times. Page Speed 
gives several recommendations on how to solve the problem e.g. removal of unused 
CSS rules and the splitting of a large CSS file into a number of files containing rules to 
be applied to specific pages. The latter approach was applied to our web application to 
improve its performance. 
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5.2 System Validation 
As a network intrusion detection system, the attack detection ability of the prototype 
system is of vital importance and the effectiveness of the IDS hinges on this ability. 
Given the system is built on the Snort IDS we are not testing the ability of Snort to 
detect attacks as this is taken for granted but rather validating that the combination of 
Snort with our web-based data submission approach functions correctly and 
successfully identifies network attacks and anomalous traffic. The Snort rule database 
contains more than 3,100 default signatures and rules separated in more than 40 rules 
files. Therefore it is not possible or feasible to test against each one. Instead we test 
against a subset and in this section report the results. 
 
Figure 5.2 Detection of Backdoor and Ping of Death 
The agent was installed on one test machine (the victim) and the IP address of another 
test machine (the attacker) added to its watchlist via the server. As a result the victim 
would forward all inbound communication from the attacker to the IDS for analysis by 
Snort. Below we report the results of a number of tests carried out using this method. 
Ping of Death 
The Ping of Death attack was described in Chapter 2. It is a type of basic DoS attack. 
This attack was launched from Ping Master [153] from the attacker against the victim 
(Figure 5.2). 
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Backdoors 
A backdoor [154] is a common malware threat faced by today‟s Internet users. Once 
installed on a victim machine it provides a hidden means of bypassing normal 
authentication to obtain remote access. A typical backdoor consists of two parts – client 
and server. The server part is installed through exploiting some vulnerability or through 
social engineering and remains active listening on a specific port for the client to 
connect. The server attempts to remain undetected. The client part is executed by an 
attacker and searches the network to locate corresponding servers. Once connected to 
the server an attacker often has complete control over its host. 
Two backdoor programs SubSeven (Sub7) [155] and NetBus [156] were installed on the 
victim and corresponding clients were installed on the attacker. The attacker then 
connected to the victim through each backdoor and issued several commands to it. At 
the server, all traffic from the malicious computer to the testing client was fed through 
Snort and correctly identified and tagged as backdoor communications. Identified threat 
signatures even indicate the version of the backdoor, such as “backdoor subseven 2.2”, 
“backdoor netbus pro 2.0 connection request”, “backdoor netbus getinfo” and so on 
(Figure 5.2).  
Probing with Nmap 
Nmap [22] is defined on its website as “A free utility for network exploration, 
administration, and security auditing”. It can scan a network to discover hosts and 
accessible services running on those hosts. Service and operating system versions may 
also be ascertained. Nmap functions can be used by hackers to locate targets through 
network scanning. During testing we installed Nmap on the attacker and used it to scan 
the victim in order to test our IDS‟s ability to detect network scans. In particular both 
Xmas and FIN scans were launched against the victim. 
 
Figure 5.3 Scans Detection 
 91 
 
In addition to supporting scanning Nmap also allows the testing for specific 
vulnerabilities prior to the implementation of an attack. The Nmap Scripting Engine 
(NSE) allows users to write custom Nmap scripts in order to extend it to take in 
vulnerability detection. The custom scripts for NSE are written in the Lua programming 
language [157]. Scripts are passed to Nmap and executed against the specified target. A 
growing set of scripts come with an Nmap installation of Nmap and some of the suitable 
ones were used to test our IDS. 
 
Figure 5.4 NSE Scripts Detection 
Many of the vulnerability-detecting scripts provided by Nmap target specific services 
and servers running on the target machine. For example, scripts are provided to detect 
exploitable vulnerabilities in web servers, FTP servers, database servers, telnet services 
etc. Therefore, in order to implement testing it is necessary to have some of these 
services available on the victim machine. As a result, it was necessary to install a web 
server IIS (Internet Information Server) on the victim in order to run the corresponding 
scripts. 
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Number Signature Name of Detected Threats (Snort) Attack Tool 
1 SCAN nmap XMAS NMAP Scan 
2 SCAN FIN NMAP Scan 
3 BAD-TRAFFIC udp port 0 traffic NMAP Scan 
4 BAD-TRAFFIC tcp port 0 traffic NMAP Scan 
5 BAD TRAFFIC Non-Standard IP protocol NMAP Scan 
6 ICMP Large ICMP Packet Ping Master 
7 BACKDOOR NetBus Pro 2.0 connection request NetBus 
8 BACKDOOR NetBus Pro 2.0 connection established NetBus 
9 BACKDOOR netbus getinfo NetBus 
10 BACKDOOR subseven 22 SubSeven 
11 INFO TELNET Bad Login Telnet Command 
12 NETBIOS SMB-DS ADMIN$ share access NMAP Scripts 
13 NETBIOS SMB-DS IPC$ share access NMAP Scripts 
14 NETBIOS SMB-DS winreg create tree attempt NMAP Scripts 
15 WEB-IIS .cnf access NMAP Scripts 
16 WEB-MISC Admin_files access NMAP Scripts 
17 WEB-MISC backup access NMAP Scripts 
18 WEB-MISC Oracle Java Process Manager access NMAP Scripts 
19 WEB-MISC TRACE attempt NMAP Scripts 
20 WEB-MISC robots.txt access NMAP Scripts 
21 SNMP request tcp NMAP Scripts 
22 SCAN SOCKS Proxy attempt NMAP Scripts 
 
Table 5.1 Detected Threats 
During testing the http-iis-webdav-vuln.nse and smb-check-vulns.nse scripts were 
executed against the victim. The smb-check-vulns.nse checks for Windows RPC 
vulnerabilities, an infection by the Conficker worm [74], SMB (Server Message Block) 
traffic exploit and a denial of service vulnerability under Windows 2000. The http-iis-
webdav-vuln.nse checks for specific vulnerabilities and common configurations errors 
in IIS, such as IIS allowing arbitrary users to search and access password-protected 
folders. 
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Results 
Given in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 are some snapshots of events detected after test attacks had 
been implemented. As can be seen in Table 5.1 all attacks were successfully identified. 
There are several factors that can affect detection results, such as the servers or services 
installed on the testing client. More servers and services running on the testing host may 
make the host easier to be targeted, so that more Nmap scripts can be used to test the 
IDS.  
5.3 Live Testing 
DCU operates a class B campus-wide network (136.206.0.0-136.206.255.255) that is 
centrally administered by the Information Systems and Services (ISS) department. In 
addition to providing a traditional LAN, a wireless network is also accessible through a 
number of access points across the University. All internal machines and servers (apart 
from a number of gateways) are protected by firewalls from the external network. The 
DCU network is part of the national HEAnet [158] network. Access to the wireless 
LAN is free and open. In addition to the University network a number of Schools within 
the University administer their own networks and have dedicated network 
administrators. One such school is the School of Computing which runs its own 
laboratory, staff and wireless networks. The wireless network is free and open and used 
by both students and staff. For the purposes of testing we deployed the agent on two 
machines, one on the School of Computing‟s laboratory network and another on its 
wireless network. Given the busy nature of both of these networks they were deemed a 
suitable deployment setting for testing the ability of our IDS to detect network problems 
and/or attacks. Both agents were left to run over a period of several weeks. 
Results 
- Absence of internal filtering 
Analysing the events submitted by each agent showed some interesting results. First it 
was apparent that traffic from subnets and networks across DCU was reaching our 
agents. Further investigation revealed that there is little or no filtering of traffic across 
DCU‟s various subnets. Once a machine is on any DCU subnet it can send traffic to any 
other host across the network. Tests were conducted by sending traffic from both 
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wireless networks (School of Computing and DCU) to the laboratory machine. All 
traffic got through indicating no filtering of traffic across network boundaries even 
when that traffic comes from an untrusted source such as a wireless network. 
- Heavy traffic on ports 137 - 139 
Analysing the reported events showed regular traffic to both agents on ports 137, 138 
and 139. These three ports are used by NetBIOS (Network Basic Input/Output System) 
services, port 137 is for NetBIOS-ns (name service), port 138 is for NetBIOS-dgm 
(datagram service), and port 139 is for NetBIOS-ssn (session service). The NetBIOS 
services are used to allow communication between applications on different hosts 
within a LAN. They also provide much information about the status of hosts in the 
network. The information could be used to map a network and attack hosts. 
- Suspicious internal IP addresses 
During testing, numerous unsolicited connection attempts were reported from IP 
addresses internal to the campus network. Over a period one particular machine on the 
wireless network attempted repeated connections to port 445 on the laboratory machine 
(see Figure 5.5). Port 445 is listed as the top attacked port in the top 10 attacked ports 
on the network security website Sectegrity [159]. Running on port 445 is a service 
called Service Message Block (SMB) used for file sharing on Windows. Once a file or 
folder is shared, this port will be automatically opened. 
 
Figure 5.5 Suspicious Internal IP addresses  
Other logged events revealed evidence of misconfigured software on the network. For 
example one machine, used to host personal staff web sites to be served over the web, at 
regular intervals sent UDP packets to port 111 on the lab machine (and to every lab 
machine). The port 111 is used by Sun‟s RPC (Remote Procedure Call) Portmapper 
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[160]. The server flagged the UDP traffic as a “bad traffic non-standard ip protocol”. 
Soon after being reported to network administrators in the School of Computing the 
traffic ceased (see figure 5.5). Its origin remains unclear. 
 
Figure 5.6 School of Computing Network Configuration 
- Suspicious foreign IP address 
The networks on which both agents were deployed sit behind the DCU firewall. Access 
to the Internet is available only through the School of Computing‟s WWW proxy server. 
The only internal IP addresses that ought to be externally reachable belong to a number 
of web servers run by staff members. E-mail and DNS services are maintained by 
network administrators and a number of additional services (SSH, FTP etc.) are 
consolidated on an application gateway that is also maintained by network 
administrators (Figure 5.6). Thus, internal machines can access the web only through 
the proxy thereby hiding their IP addresses and restricting Internet traffic from 
laboratory machines. Should an internal user wish to connect to an external FTP server 
they must do so from an application gateway. Should an external user wish to FTP data 
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to their DCU account they can connect only to the application gateway. In summary 
internal IP addresses should be directly accessible only on a small number of machines 
and only on a restricted number of ports. Obviously, foreign IP addresses should not 
show up on DCU-internal network except on application gateways. Users expect a 
degree of protection from the Internet to be provided by the DCU firewalls. 
However, not long after being deployed on internal networks foreign IP addresses began 
showing up in the event submissions from the two clients. Furthermore, even though the 
two agents were on separate subnets the same foreign IP addresses would often show up 
in submissions from both agents. A first assumption was that some malware on an 
internal network was spoofing an external IP address and sending the spoofed packet to 
the agent. This should not be allowed since a correctly configured router should drop 
externally-addressed packets arriving on an internal interface. A test was conducted and 
a spoofed packet (with a DCU-external IP address) was sent between two internal 
networks. The packet was successfully delivered to its destination. This indicates a 
misconfigured internal router and/or firewall. However, the number and frequency of 
packets on the network from foreign IP addresses and the times at which they were 
logged (early hours of the morning) indicated that perhaps the traffic was not all 
internally generated. Further testing was carried from external networks to direct 
packets at the internal machines hosting the agents. The IP addresses of the external 
host machines did indeed reach the agent. While not all packets were successfully 
delivered the fact that a proportion was delivered reveals a significant security flaw. 
This information has been passed on to network administrators and the cause is under 
investigation. (Note that the problem is not restricted to the School of Computing, 
similar foreign IP addresses showed up on the campus-wide wireless network). 
 
Figure 5.7 Foreign IP addresses and the Slammer worm 
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A sample of the foreign IP addresses (originating in China) was checked against both 
the Sectegrity and Dshield web sites. Four were listed in the Sectegrity Top 100 
Attacking Hosts list [159] and each of these four addresses was also listed by DShield 
[161]. 
Not only were foreign packets hitting internal machines but the traffic reaching those 
machines was (and is) actively attacking them. UDP packets originating from external 
networks and submitted to port 1434 when analysed by Snort were shown to be 
attempted propagations by the Slammer worm [92]. Given this exploit proceeds without 
the establishment of a connection it is especially dangerous since should it hit a 
vulnerable internal machine infection is guaranteed. During the test period, more than 
one hundred Slammer worm attack attempts were detected by the system. Further 
analysis on the origin of these attacks showed 60% were from China and the other 40% 
from the US, Korea and Canada. The Slammer worm targets vulnerabilities in 
Microsoft SQL Server products. Once a host is infected by a Slammer worm, it will 
launch a denial-of-service attack against some Internet hosts and slow down network 
speed considerably. 
Many suspicious source addresses had thousands of DShield reports associated with 
them and some were attempting to connect to port 1024 (Figure 5.7), a port that is often 
used by backdoor applications including NetSpy [162] and Mydoom [163]. Other 
popular destination ports included 10000 which hosts Webmin, a service with known 
vulnerabilities [164]. The server logs also revealed some foreign packets aimed at port 
161, a port associated with SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) services. 
This event in itself seems suspicious, but more so given the documented insecurities in 
SNMP [165]. 
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter the performance of the server in delivering web pages was measured 
using Google‟s Page Speed. Based on its recommendations, modifications were made to 
the server code to speed up page load times. In order to verify the system was capable of 
detecting and reporting attacks some malware and tools were used to attack an agent. In 
each case the server-side Snort installation detected, identified and reported the attack. 
Lastly, the system was deployed on two DCU-internal networks. There it successfully 
revealed several issues including the accessibility of internal networks to machines 
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operating from internal but untrustworthy locations (wireless networks). Reports 
submitted indicate the regular probing of internal hosts by other internal machines and 
also the presence of misconfigured software on at least one machine. Lastly and most 
seriously the agent revealed that internal machines are not adequately protected by 
firewalls and are being actively targeted for malware infection by external machines. It 
is our conjecture that had the system described here been deployed and used by DCU 
staff, made aware their machines were being targeted whilst on the DCU network the 
problem would have been fixed sooner. Furthermore, it would have demonstrated to 
users that they are targets, that assumed defences may not be protecting them and that a 
defence-in-depth approach is required. It is worth noting that DCU uses a third party to 
help maintain network security. In the next chapter we summarise the work presented in 
this thesis and suggest further work aimed at improving the described prototype system. 
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6 Conclusions and Future Work 
This thesis sought to answer “Whether intrusion detection and management can be 
effectively offered as a web service to users in order to better protect them and heighten 
their awareness of the Internet security threat”. In this chapter the approach adopted to 
answering the latter research question is reviewed in Section 6.1 and each chapter‟s 
contribution is summarised. In Section 6.2 conclusions and the thesis‟s contribution to 
the area of IDS are presented. The chapter concludes in Section 6.3 with suggestions for 
future work. 
6.1 Chapter Summary 
Described in this thesis was the motivation for and implementation of a web-enabled 
intrusion detection system. It was organised as follows: 
Chapter 1: This chapter provided the problem statement and research question. The poor 
state of network security was highlighted and our research question was stated. Factors 
that contribute to weak network security (increased mobility, lack of security awareness 
and a rising threat level) were presented. The security of the networked computers of 
non-technical users was the primary consideration of this research. A review of the 
requirements of individual users, small business networks and system administrators 
was presented. 
Chapter 2: If there were no threat, no defence would be required. The aim of this 
chapter was to provide evidence that the threat is real and examples of those threats. In 
order to understand the threats to which users are subjected some network history is 
required. An explanation of network communication was presented including network 
communication layers and network protocols. Internet threats and attacks were 
investigated. Threats and attacks were separated into different categories, were analysed 
and examples were given. 
Chapter 3: The threat having been established in Chapter 2, in this chapter the available 
defences were reviewed. Defences including firewalls, antivirus software and intrusion 
detection systems were covered. Because the focus of this research is on IDS, an 
emphasis was placed on those defences and how they are implemented. 
 100 
 
Chapter 4: A set of requirements were presented for a new IDS to respond to the threats 
described in Chapter 2 and in the face of the shortcomings of the defences described in 
Chapter 3. The design and implementation of an IDS aimed at meeting these 
requirements was described in detail. A hybrid, distributed agent-based intrusion 
detection approach was proposed. Example use cases were presented. 
Chapter 5: This chapter presented the results of testing of the system described in 
Chapter 4. Performance testing was carried out and some modifications made to the 
system based on the results. Various utilities were used to implement attacks against a 
test installation and attack detection and reporting was verified. Lastly the system was 
deployed on two networks in the School of Computing at DCU. The usefulness of the 
system was demonstrated in its ability to detect both misconfigured machines and 
network security problems. 
6.2 Conclusions 
The research presented in this thesis has demonstrated the feasibility and value of 
providing web-enabled IDS feedback to users faced with rising Internet threat levels. 
The primary contribution of this research is the development of a prototype 
implementation that has already proven its usefulness in detecting both real world 
attacks and network security weaknesses. It was not the aim of the work to develop the 
means of detecting new attacks but rather to explore the means of bringing expertise to 
users and raising their threat awareness levels. The prototype reported here meets both 
of those key requirements. 
6.3 Future Work 
The proposed IDS, as implemented, is a proof-of-concept and is not without limitations. 
Some of those shortcomings are described below along with proposed solutions: 
Agent 
 Spoofing of events is a problem for most IDSs and the one described here is no 
exception. If a reported event is attributed to a client, the server should be able to 
validate whether that event was genuinely initiated by that client, in order to 
avoid making incorrect decisions. Because the source IP address is easy to spoof, 
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some malicious computer could simulate a client by using a spoofed IP address 
to implement attacks. Spoofing makes it difficult to implement countermeasures.  
 Currently the client user must seek feedback by logging into the application. 
Having feedback provided through a browser plugin would allow for more 
interaction with the server through pop up messages presenting reports as they 
come in. 
 Dynamic rulesets could be applied to clients connecting from different network 
environments. For example, when a client is in its home network, which is 
presumably secure and protected by firewalls, a less strict configuration and 
ruleset could be applied. When this client is in a non-secure network such as on 
an airport or a café wireless network, the agent could ask the server to give it a 
different configuration and ruleset, relatively stricter than the configuration and 
ruleset used in the home network. 
 There is a design flaw in the current prototype. The agent opens a port for 
listening for configuration updates from the server. This requires unwanted 
client-side firewall modification. This flaw could be avoided by the agent 
periodically polling for updates from the server rather than maintaining a listener 
and opening a port in the client firewall. 
 Over-reporting is an issue. When a machine attempts to connect to a filtered 
port it will receive no response. The protocol may be such that it will 
automatically retry connecting. The extra protocol-initiated attempt should not 
be reported as an additional event as is currently the case. 
 It is also possible for the agent to report thousands of similar events. This should 
not be the case as it could lead to a denial-of-service through bandwidth 
consumption and may also aid concealment of real attacks in server-side event 
logs. More sophisticated client-side processing might buffer events, analyse 
them for similarity and submit one plus a count of duplicates.  
 Agent security is an issue. Currently the agent configuration files stored on the 
client are stored in plaintext and are open to manipulation and to local tampering. 
These configuration files should be encrypted for security. Also, the agent itself 
and its configuration files can be deleted. Such actions should be made 
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privileged operations and associated with a privileged account. The agent itself 
may contain exploitable vulnerabilities due to insecure code. A code review and 
static analysis should be carried out to catch such coding errors. Also, the agent 
has not been tested for denial-of-service vulnerabilities. It should be stress tested 
in order to reveal performance bottlenecks. Public key certificates and HTTPS 
should in future be applied to allow an agent to securely authenticate a server 
and to ensure all agent-server communication is encrypted. 
Watchlist 
 The IP-based watchlist in the prototype has its drawbacks. Receiving a new IP 
address over DHCP is enough to escape from the current watchlist. Also, a 
DHCP address on being freed may be reassigned to a trustworthy machine not 
requiring monitoring. In the future the watchlist could be changed to client-
based or even both. 
Threat Response  
 If it could be established that a client machine was infected with malware 
(although a solution to the spoofing problem must be found before this can be 
done) then black listing of an infected client could be implemented. This might 
involve denying Internet access to a particular agent until the owner has had the 
machine sanitised.  
Communication 
 In order to encrypt communications between agents and the server, HTTPS 
should be used in future. Also, data at the server should be securely stored. 
Server 
 It is straightforward to launch a scan against an agent and have it submit 
thousands of events to the server. Browsing these events server side is currently 
cumbersome. It should be possible to remove duplication in the presented events. 
 While the interfaces to both administrators and users provided by the server are 
functional, no usability testing has been carried out on those interfaces. Usability 
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testing is a key requirement for end user acceptance and usability testing should 
be carried out and feedback incorporated. 
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